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SOL (MSHA) V. AMAX COAL WEST
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FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
5203 LEESBURG PIKE
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA 22041

SECRETARY OF LABOR, : CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH :
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), : Docket No. WEST 94-289
Petitioner : A. C. No. 48-00732-03523
v. :
 : Belle Ayr Mine
AMAX COAL WEST INCORPORATED, :
Respondent :

DECISION

Appearances: Ann M. Noble, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S.
Department of Labor, Denver, Colorado for
Petitioner;
R. Henry Moore, Esq., Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C.,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania for Respondent.

Before: Judge Hodgdon

This case is before me on a petition for assessment of civil penalty filed by the Secretary of Labor, acting through his Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), against Amax Coal West Incorporated, pursuant to Sections 105 and 110 of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815 and 820. The petition alleges two violations of the Secretary's mandatory health and safety standards and seeks a penalty of \$100.00. For the reasons set forth below, I vacate the citations and dismiss the petition.

This case was heard on August 30, 1994, in Gillette, Wyoming. MSHA Inspector Lewis H. Klay Ko testified for the Secretary. Randall L. Rahm, Clyde W. Witcher, James L. Phipps, Jr., and Terry R. Bosecker testified on behalf of Amax. The parties also filed post-hearing briefs which I have considered in my disposition of this case.

BACKGROUND

Amax operates the Belle Ayr Mine in Campbell County, Wyoming. The mine consists of a strip coal mine, preparation and loading facilities. Among Amax's customers are two utilities, Northern Indiana Power and Service Company (NIPSCO) and Southwest Electric Power Company (SWEPCO).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

It seems obvious from these facts that either CBS or NALCO should have been the recipient of the citations. The question in this case is whether Amax could be issued the citations. Amax argues that the inspector abused his discretion in issuing it the citations and that they should, therefore, be vacated and the civil penalty petition dismissed. I conclude that Amax is correct.

Prior Commission Decisions

While it is clear that the Secretary has wide enforcement discretion, there is little guidance on if, when or how he can abuse this discretion. In Phillips Uranium Corp., 4 FMSHRC 549 (April 1982), the Commission vacated citations and orders issued to an operator, holding that they should have been issued to an independent contractor. In that case, Phillips owned mining rights and was conducting mining activities at a proposed uranium mine. It retained independent contractors to construct shafts and related underground construction. None of the contractors had MSHA identification numbers.

The Commission found that:

The citations and orders alleging violations of the Act described activities or omissions of the contractors' employees or conditions of the contractors' equipment or facilities relating to the work the contractors were engaged to perform. Phillips' employees, equipment or activities did not cause or contribute to the alleged violations. Phillips' employees did not perform any work for the contractors, but they did inspect and observe the progress of the work to assure compliance with quality control and contract specifications. The alleged violations were abated by employees of the contractors.

Id. at 549-550.

In holding that the contractors should have been cited, the Commission said:

The Secretary's insistence on proceeding against Phillips appears to be a litigation decision resting solely on considerations of the Secretary's administrative convenience, rather than on a concern for the health and safety of miners. In choosing the course that is administratively convenient, the Secretary has ignored Congressional intent, the

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Consolidation Coal Company, 11 FMSHRC 1439, 1443 (August 1989); Cathedral Bluffs, 796 F.2d at 537-38; Old Ben, 1 FMSHRC at 1481-86." Id. at 1361.

Most recently, the Commission decided W-P Coal Co., 16 FMSHRC 1407 (July 1994). That case involved a decision to cite W-P, the company that held the mining rights to a mine, in addition to Top Kat, the company W-P had contracted with to perform the mining. The judge had relied on Phillips Uranium in concluding that the Secretary had impermissibly cited W-P based on "administrative convenience" rather than the protective purposes of the Act.

In reversing the judge, the Commission said:

We agree with the Secretary that the judge erred in relying solely on Phillips Uranium. That case, decided in 1982, was directed to the Secretary's earlier policy of pursuing only owner-operators for their contractors's violations. Subsequently, the Secretary's policy has been broadened to include pursuit of independent contractor-operators in some instances. It is now well established that, in instances of multiple operators, the Secretary may, in general, proceed against either an owner operator, his contractor, or both. Bulk Transportation Services, Inc., 13 FMSHRC 1354, 1360 (September 1991); Consolidation Coal Co., 11 FMSHRC 1439, 1443 (August 1989). The Commission and the courts have recognized that the Secretary has wide enforcement discretion. See, e.g., Bulk Transportation, 13 FMSHRC at 1360-61; Consolidation Coal, 11 FMSHRC at 1443; Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 790 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, the Commission has recognized that its review of the Secretary's action in citing an operator is appropriate to guard against abuse of discretion. E.g., Bulk Transportation, 13 FMSHRC at 1360-61; Consolidation Coal, 11 FMSHRC at 1443.

Id. at 1411. The Commission went on to examine W-P's involvement in the mining operation and concluded that "the record reveals that W-P was sufficiently involved with the mine to support the Secretary's decision to proceed against W-P." Id.

Analysis and Conclusions

Applying this precedent to the case at hand, it appears that this case is most like Phillips Uranium. However, although the Commission has not expressly overruled Phillips Uranium, it severely limited its applicability in W-P Coal. Consequently, since this case does not involve "the Secretary's earlier policy

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of pursuing only owner-operators for their contractors' violations," I conclude that Phillips Uranium is not pertinent.

Old Dominion and Cathedral Bluffs would also seem to support a finding that the Secretary abused his discretion in citing Amax. Although both cases were subsequently overruled by the courts, neither was overruled on the issue of whether the operator, in Cathedral Bluffs, or the independent contractor, in Old Dominion, should or should not have been cited for the violation. Therefore, it would seem that the reasons given by the Commission for concluding that the operator should not have been cited, with the exception of its holding that the Secretary's guidelines were binding, and that the independent contractor was correctly cited would still provide guidance today.

On the other hand, it may also be significant that since Cathedral Bluffs, there have been no Commission decisions finding an abuse of the Secretary's discretion in citing either the operator or the independent contractor or both. The later cases, Consolidation Coal, Bulk Transportation and W-P Coal, seem to have been decided on the degree of involvement between the operator and the independent contractor. Therefore, I conclude that while Cathedral Bluffs and Old Dominion may be instructive in this case, they are not dispositive.

Were it not for the Commission's statement in W-P Coal that Commission review guards against an abuse of discretion by the Secretary in issuing a citation, one might conclude from the most recent cases that the Secretary is free to cite the operator, the independent contractor, or both, as he sees fit. However, by stating that it will guard against an abuse of discretion the Commission has clearly implied that there is some limit to the Secretary's enforcement decisions. While the Commission has never set out what that limit is, and the term "discretion" indicates the absence of a hard and fast rule, it does mean that the Secretary cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously. *Langnes v. Green*, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931).

While acknowledging that the Secretary has wide enforcement discretion, it appears that if ever there was a case where the Secretary abused this discretion in citing an operator instead of an independent contractor, this is it. Amax has virtually no involvement with NALCO or CBS. The independent contractor was not hired to perform services for Amax, but for two of Amax's customers. The contractor was not retained by Amax, but by the customers. Conversely, in all of the cases discussed above, there was a contractual relationship between the operator and the independent contractor.

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construct the tanks, make arrangements for their use and placement or use the tanks for any of its mining operations. Nor were the tanks used by the contractor in connection with any of Amax's mining operations.

To argue that permitting the tanks on the property and failing to inspect them for possible violations are acts or omissions contributing to the occurrence of a violation, as the Secretary does, is to argue that there can never be a situation when the contractor rather than the operator should be cited. By that standard, Amax would always be responsible for every violation occurring on its property. Under that standard Amax had an obligation to inspect another contractor's pickup truck, which was cited the same day, for a defective parking brake. (Tr. 25.) Yet even the inspector agreed that the contractor was the proper entity to cite in that case.

Amax did not contribute by act or omission to the continued existence of a violation committed by an independent contractor for the same reasons it did not contribute to the occurrence of the violation. Interestingly, the Secretary argues that (1) applies in this case, but (2) does not. Yet it would seem that the reasons he gives for (1) being applicable, that Amax permitted the tanks on the property and did not inspect them, would also apply to (2).

Amax's miners were not exposed to the hazards. None of them had duties that required them to work around the tanks or to climb the ladders on the tanks. None of Amax's employees had any reason to be in the vicinity of the tanks, as tanks were not in an area normally travelled by those employees, and the ladders were on the opposite side of the tanks. (Tr. 89.) To argue that this guideline applies in this case because an Amax employee was not prevented from climbing the ladders would stretch the guideline beyond relevance.

Finally, it is obvious that Amax had no control over the condition needing abatement. It had no authority to put a backguard on the ladders, put handholds at the top of the ladders, remove the ladders from the tanks or in any meaningful way correct the situation. The fact that, having been issued a citation, Amax directed CBS to remove the tanks from its property does not demonstrate that Amax had control over the condition needing abatement. Clearly, the entity having control over the violative conditions was CBS or NALCO.

The manual's guidelines all indicate that the contractor, rather than Amax, should have received the citations. To argue, as the Secretary does, that solely by permitting NALCO to be on its property Amax's conduct satisfies the guidelines would render the guidelines superfluous and unnecessary.

