Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission
Office of Administrative
Law Judges
Office: (303) 844-5266/Fax: (303) 844-5268
April 6, 2012
SECRETARY OF LABOR, |
: : : : : : : : : : |
CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING Docket No. LAKE 2008-422-M A.C. No.: 11-03114-136 Mine: Portable Plant #1 |
Appearances: Beau Ellis, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Denver, Colorado for Petitioner;
Daniel P. Foltniewicz, Voss Sand Works, Inc., Wheaton, Illinois for Respondent.
Before: Judge Miller
ORDER GRANTING THE SECRETARY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DECISION
ORDER TO PAY
This case is before me upon a petition for assessment of civil penalty filed by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 105(d) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (the “Act”). The case involves three 104(a) citations issued to Voss Sand Works (“Voss”) on April 25, 2007. Voss has agreed to accept Citation Nos. 6186227 and 6186228 as written and pay the associated penalties. Citation No. 6186226 remains at issue and is the subject of this order.
On May 9, 2011, the Secretary of Labor (the “Secretary”) filed a Motion for Summary Decision (“Motion”) pursuant to Commission Procedural Rule 67, 29 C.F.R. § 2700.67. On May 25, 2011, Voss filed a Response to Secretary’s Motion for Summary Decision (“Response”). Subsequently, the Secretary filed a Reply to Voss’s Response (“Reply”), which was then followed by Voss’s Surreply (“Surreply”).
I. BACKGROUND
On April 25, 2007, Inspector Jay Bell with the Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) issued Citation No. 6186226 under section 104(a) of the Act alleging a violation of Section 56.11001, which requires that “[s]afe means of access shall be provided and maintained to all working places.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.11001. The citation alleges:
On the plants secondary work boat used to work on the pipeline and dredge, as well as the back up for the transportation to and from the dredge. Was not provided with any railings to include mid-rail, to keep a person from falling into the water should the boat shift for any reason while being worked on. The operator did have a lifejacket on when he went to operate the unit. If a man fell from the boat it could result in lost work days or restricted duty. Depending on how the man fell. Boat was in operation when the violation was cited. Boat is usually operated by one person.
Inspector Bell determined that an injury or illness was unlikely to occur, but that any injury would result in lost workdays or restricted duty, that the violation was not significant and substantial (“S&S”), that one person would be affected, and that the violation was a result of moderate negligence on the part of the operator. The Secretary has proposed a penalty of $100.00 for this violation.
On March 9, 2011, the Secretary filed a Motion to Amend Citation No. 6186226 and the Petition for Assessment of Penalty to Allege, in the Alternative, a Violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.11027 (“Motion to Amend). The Motion to Amend was granted by the Court on April 21, 2011. Section 56.11027 provides, in pertinent part, that “working platforms shall be . . . provided with handrails[.]” 30 C.F.R. § 56.11027.
II. STIPULATIONS
The parties jointly stipulated to a number of key facts. The stipulations are as follows:[1]
III. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
A. Secretary of Labor’s Motion for
Summary Decision
The Secretary asserts that she is
entitled to summary decision. She
contends that the boat, also referred to as the “secondary work boat,” is both
a “working platform [and working place] . . . used to work on the pipeline and
the dredge, as well as for transportation [over the lake] to and from work on
the dredge and pipe line.” Sec’y Mot. 5,
9. At the time the subject citation was
issued, the boat did not have handrails of any kind.
The Secretary argues that, by
failing to provide handrails of any kind on the boat, Voss violated Section
56.11001, which requires that “[s]afe means of access be maintained to all
working places.” Id. at 6-7. The boat was
designed and built “to carry miners from the dock to the dredge and pipe line”
and “safe access would include a railing around the sides of the
boat/platform.”
Alternatively, the Secretary argues that Voss does not satisfy Section 56.11027, which requires that “working platforms shall be . . . provided with handrails.” Sec’y Mot. 6-7. She argues that the boat is a “working platform” and points to Judge Barbour’s decision in Rohloff Sand & Gravel Co. where he held that platforms near water should have handrails in situations were a miner could slip and fall into the water. 20 FMSHRC 868, 872 (1998) (ALJ); Sec’y Mot. 8-9.
The Secretary notes that both the originally cited standard and the alternatively cited standard are grouped in her regulations under the larger heading of “travelways,” which are defined as “a passage, walk or way regularly used and designated for person to go from one place to another.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.2; Sec’y Mot. 7.
Finally, the Secretary argues that, based on the inspector’s findings regarding the criteria set forth in Section 110(i) of the Mine Act and Section 100 of the Secretary’s regulations, the proposed penalty of $100.00 is appropriate. Sec’y Mot. 9.
B. Voss’ Response
Voss argues that there are factual
issues that must be resolved and that the Secretary is not entitled to summary
decision. Voss Resp. 1. Specifically, Voss contends that the
Secretary’s use of multiple standards raises factual questions.
Voss argues that a MSHA
investigator previously asked Josh Voss, owner of Voss, about any problems with
the secondary work boat and Voss responded that lifejackets were worn when
working on the water.
Voss also points to APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 26 FMSHRC 811 (2004) (ALJ), where a walkway on a floating dredge had not been fixed with railings to prevent a person from walking, tripping or slipping into the water when traversing the walkway. There, the judge found that the Secretary’s evidence fell short of establishing that the cited area was a travelway. Id. at 812; Voss Resp. 7.
Voss no longer contests Citation Nos. 6186227 and 6186228 and concedes that the penalties for those citations are appropriate. Voss Resp. 7. Voss requests Citation No 6186226 be vacated and that “the Administrative Law Judge den[y] the proposed penalty.” Id.
C. Secretary of Labor’s Reply
Although
Voss alleges that there are factual issues that still need to be resolved, Voss
offers no information regarding the relevant facts that remain at issue. Sec’y Rep. 1.
Voss contends that the Secretary’s use of different standards raises
factual issues, however, that is not the case.
Id. The Court has already granted the Secretary’s
Motion to Amend Citation No. 6186226 and Plead in the Alternative.
Voss’ argument that an inspector saw the secondary workboat during a prior inspection and did not cite it does not mean that a hazard did not exist at the time of the subject inspection. See Sunny Ridge Mining Co., 19 FMSHRC 254, 267-7 (1997) (ALJ) (citations omitted); Sec’y Rep. 3. Moreover, the other cases cited by Voss in support of its arguments are distinguishable from the matter at hand. Sec’y Rep. 3-4.
D. Voss’ Surreply.
Voss again
claims there are factual issues to be resolved.
Voss Surr. 1. When the Secretary
filed her Motion to Amend Citation No. 6186226, it was the third standard the
Secretary used to address the alleged violation.
IV. DISCUSSION
Commission’s Procedural Rule 67 sets forth the grounds for granting summary decision as follows:
A motion for summary decision shall be granted only if the entire record, including the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, shows:
(1) That there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and
(2) That the moving party is entitled to summary decision as a matter of law.
29 C.F.R. § 2700.67. I find that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the Secretary is entitled to summary decision as a matter of law. While Voss does not stylize its Response or Surreply as a cross-motion for summary decision, I treat them as such given that the parties have submitted joint stipulations and that Voss argues that the citation should be vacated based on the evidence before me. Finally, I note that the parties have relied primarily on the decisions of other administrative law judges. While I am not bound by the decisions of other Commission judges, in appropriate circumstances I may be guided by those decisions.
For organizational purposes, I first address Voss’ argument that the Secretary’s use of multiple legal standards raises genuine issues regarding material facts of this case. Voss maintains that there is a factual issue embedded in the alternative pleadings that needs to be resolved. Voss Rep. 2; Voss Surr. 2. I disagree with Voss, and agree with the Secretary, who stated in her Reply that, while Voss “believes ‘there are factual issues to be resolved,’ it offers no argument of the factual issues.” Sec’y Rep. 2 (citing Sec’y Resp. 1). The use of alternative standards in the context of this proceeding is a question of law that has already been answered. The Secretary properly filed a Motion to Amend Citation No. 6186226 and allege, in the alternative, a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.11027. On April 21, 2011, in granting the Secretary’s motion, Judge Biro held:
The gravamen of the charge described in the text of Citation Number 618226 is the lack of any railings on Respondent’s work boat. The standard that the Secretary now seeks to allege Respondent violated (30 C.F.R. 56.11027) more precisely specifies a legal requirement for handrails than the general “safe access” rules originally cited (30 C.F.R. § 56.11001).
Order Granting Sec’y Mot. to Plead in the Alternative 4 (Apr. 21, 2011).[2] I see no reason to disturb Judge Biro’s ruling and agree that the Secretary properly amended her petition and that the Respondent’s argument is without merit. Accordingly, I will first analyze the record in the context of the originally cited standard, Section 56.11001, and then in the context of the alternatively cited standard, Section 56.11027.
Section 56.11001 requires that
“[s]afe means of access shall be provided and maintained to all working
places.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.11001. The Secretary’s regulations define “working
place” to be “any place in or about a mine where work is being performed.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.2. It is undisputed that the secondary boat “was
used by Respondent to work on the pipeline and the dredge, as well as being
used as a source of transportation to and from working on the dredge
pipe[]line.” Stip. 10. I find that both the boat and the dredge are
working places. The stipulation makes
clear that, at times, miners stood on the boat while working on the pipeline
and dredge. Moreover, the statement that
the boat was used to transport miners “to and from working on the dredge[,]” makes clear that work was also done while
standing on the dredge itself.
Given that I have already found a violation of Section 56.11001, I need not address the Secretary’s alternative pleading. However, had the undisputed material facts not shown a violation of Section 56.11001, I nevertheless would have found a violation of Section 56.11027. Section 56.11027 requires, in pertinent part, that “working platforms shall be . . . provided with handrails[.].” 30 C.F.R. § 56.11027. The Secretary’s regulations do not define the term “working platform.” “In the absence of a statutory or regulatory definition of a term, the Commission applies the ordinary meaning of that term.” Twentymile Coal Co., 30 FMSHRC 736, 750 (Aug. 2008). The dictionary defines “platform” as “a horizontal flat surface usu. higher than the adjoining area.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 873 (1979). Given that a “working place” is “any place in or about a mine where work is being performed,” 30 C.F.R. § 56.2, logically, a “working platform” is any elevated, horizontal, flat surface in or about a mine where work is being performed. (emphasis added); 30 C.F.R. § 56.2; see also Empire Iron Mining, 19 FMSHRC 1912, 1920 (Dec. 1997) (ALJ). Again, it is undisputed that the boat “was used by Respondent to work on the pipeline and the dredge, as well as being used as a source of transportation to and from working on the dredge pipe[]line.” Stip. 10. The stipulation makes clear that miners stood on the boat while working on the pipeline and dredge. Moreover, it is undisputed that handrails were not provided on the boat. The only question that remains is whether the boat is a “platform.” I find that the boat is a platform. The photographs of the boat reveal that the deck was an elevated, horizontal, flat surface. Sec’y Mot. Exs. G and H. The boat’s deck was higher than the waterline. Moreover, while it is not clear how deep the water in the area was, obviously the boat’s deck was higher than the lake bed beneath the surface of the water. The boat had no restraints to prevent a miner from falling off of the boat and into the water. Given that the boat was a working platform, and that there were no handrails provided, the undisputed material facts evidence a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.11027.
Voss argues that the secondary boat had not been cited during previous inspections and that, consequently, the citation should be vacated. However, this argument does not address the existence or nonexistence of this particular violation. Hazardous conditions can develop quickly, and an investigator may inadvertently overlook violative conditions. In short, even if the violation was not cited during previous MSHA inspections, it does not mean the hazard did not exist at the time the subject citation was issued.
Voss cites two other Commission ALJ decisions for the proposition that a handrail was not needed on the boat, i.e., Fleniken’s Sand & Gravel and APAC Mississipi. However, as correctly pointed out by the Secretary, neither of these cases addresses the standards at issue.
Consistent with the above analysis, I find that the Secretary has established a violation of Section 56.11001.
V. CITATION NOS. 6186227
AND 6186228
Voss has agreed to accept Citation Nos. 6186227 and 6186228 as written and pay the associated penalties. Accordingly, I assess the $100.00 penalties originally proposed by the Secretary for Citation Nos. 6186227 and 6186228.
VI. APPROPRIATE CIVIL
PENALTY
Section 110(i) of the Act lists six criteria to be considered in determining appropriate civil penalties.[3] Notably, Voss does not dispute the Secretary’s assessment of the penalty criteria. Rather, Voss only argues that the citation should be vacated and no penalty should be assessed. Voss Resp. 7. I have already found a violation of the originally cited standard. I accept the Secretary’s assessment of the penalty criteria and Voss’ stipulation that the proposed penalty will not affect its ability to continue in business. Stip. Nos. 17 and 19. I find that the Secretary’s proposed penalty of $100.00 is appropriate for Citation No. 6186226.
VII. ORDER
The Secretary’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED. Citation Nos. 6186226, 6186227, and 6186228 are AFFIRMED in all respects. Voss is ORDERED TO PAY the secretary of Labor the sum of $300.00 within 30 days of the date of this decision.
/s/
Margaret Miller
Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:
Beau Ellis, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 1999 Broadway, Suite 800, Denver, CO 80202-5708.
Daniel P. Foltniewicz, Voss Sand Works, Inc., P.O. Box 5312, Wheaton, IL 60189.
[1] I note that Stipulation Nos. 10 and 11, while not included in the Secretary’s Motion, were included in Voss’ Response. The Secretary does not dispute those stipulations. I find that Voss has stipulated to such.
[2] On January 26, 2012, LAKE 2008-422-M was reassigned from Judge Biro to the undersigned judge.
[3] The Act requires that, in assessing civil monetary penalties, the Commission [ALJ] shall consider six statutory penalty criteria:
[1] the operator's history of previous violations, [2] the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged, [3] whether the operator was negligent, [4] the effect on the operator's ability to continue in business, [5] the gravity of the violation, and [6] the demonstrated good faith of the person charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notification of a violation.
30 U.S.C. § 820(i).