FEDERAL MINE SAFETY
AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
1331 PENNSYLVANIA
AVE., N.W., SUITE 520N
WASHINGTON, DC
20004-1710
TELEPHONE:
202-434-9933 / FAX: 202-434-9949
July 2, 2015
PORTABLE, INC., Applicant, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), Respondent. |
|
|
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROCEEDING Docket No. EAJA 2015-1-M Formerly WEST 2013-526-M Mine ID: 24-02016 Mine: Wash Plant |
DECISION
Before: Judge Moran
Portable, Inc. (“Portable”),
Applicant in this matter, has filed an application for an award of fees and
expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), contending that the
Secretary of Labor’s action in WEST 2013-526-M was not substantially justified.
Thereafter, the Secretary filed an Objection to the Application. Portable then
filed a reply and the Secretary submitted a short surreply.
Initially, the Secretary’s Objection challenged both Portable’s claim that the
Secretary was not substantially justified in proceeding against it as well as
the fees and expenses sought. However, the Secretary’s surreply
reduced the issues to be resolved to the substantial justification question,
the Secretary having conceded, upon reviewing the additional information
provided by Portable in its reply, that Portable had
subsequently provided additional information in the Declarations attached to
its latest brief, which sufficed to show that it incurred the attorney fees and
costs which it seeks. As a consequence of that additional supporting
information, the Secretary’s surreply stated that he
“concedes that Portable is eligible for an award, as it meets the size criteria
and has incurred fees in defense of an action on which it was the prevailing
party,” while maintaining that, on the merits, it is not entitled to such an
award. Surreply at 1.
For the reasons which follow, the Court
finds that the Secretary’s action was not substantially justified and awards
the fees sought by Portable.
Background
As set forth in the Court’s December 5,
2014, decision in WEST 2013-526-M, Sec’y
of Labor v. Portable, Inc., 36 FMSHRC 3249, 3250 (Dec. 2014) (ALJ), MSHA’s
Dennis Bellfi arrived at Portable Inc.’s mine on August 16, 2012, to perform a
general inspection. Bellfi’s inspection was delayed
by approximately one-half hour. Id. at 3251. As a consequence of the delay, MSHA contends
that Portable unreasonably
delayed the inspection, in violation of section 103(a) of the Mine Act, 30
U.S.C. § 813(a)
(2012).[1]
The Court noted that the issue was whether, in the context of the findings of
fact, there was an unreasonable delay in this instance. Id. at 3254. For the reasons
detailed below, and as set forth in its decision, the Court found that “Portable did not unreasonably delay Bellfi’s inspection or indirectly deny access to its mine
on August 16, and therefore, did not violate section 103(a).” Id. at 3259.
EAJA Actions and
the Substantial Justification Issue
In large measure, the parties are in
agreement as to the legal test for determining whether the government’s
position was substantially justified. While the test for establishing
substantial justification is not so minimal that the government need only show
that it did not act frivolously, it does not require more than mere reasonableness to sustain the government’s action. The
Supreme Court has described the justification as being satisfied if “a
reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis
in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2. (1988).
As the Commission stated in Black Diamond Constr., Inc., 21 FMSHRC 1188,
1194, 1198 (Nov. 1999):
EAJA
provides that a prevailing party may be awarded attorney’s fees unless the
position of the United States is substantially justified. Contractors Sand
and Gravel, Inc., 20 FMSHRC 960, 967 (Sept. 1998), appeal docketed, No.
98–1480 (D.C.Cir. Oct. 20, 1998). The Supreme Court
has defined substantially justified as “justified in substance or in the main,”
or a position that has “a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). In Pierce, the Court set forth
the test for substantial justification as follows: “a position can be justified
even though it is not correct, and we believe it can be substantially (i.e.,
for the most part) justified if a reasonable person could think it correct,
that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Id.
at 566 n. 2. The Court also noted that certain “ ‘objective
indicia’ such as the terms of a settlement agreement, the stage in the
proceedings at which the merits were decided, and the views of other courts on
the merits” can be relevant to the inquiry of whether the government’s position
was substantially justified. Id. at 568. In
EAJA proceedings, the agency bears the burden of establishing that its position
was substantially justified. Lundin v. Mecham,
980 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C.Cir.1992). When reviewing an administrative law
judge’s EAJA decision, the Commission applies the substantial evidence test for
factual issues and de novo review for legal issues. Contractors,
20 FMSHRC at 966–67. [The Commission then added, agreeing with the
administrative law judge’s characterization that] the essence of substantial
justification is whether reasonable people could genuinely differ.
Portable’s
Application for an Award of Fees and Expenses under the Equal Access to Justice
Act
In its application, Portable notes that,
[p]ursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2700.69, Judge Moran’s decision
represents his final disposition of the matter where Portable unquestionably
prevailed. The Secretary failed to appeal this decision and it has not been
directed for review by the Commission. Therefore, pursuant to Section 113(d)(1) of the Mine Act, this decision is now the final
decision of the Commission. As such, Portable meets the minimal standard
required by the Act of having prevailing party status.
Application at 6. Portable also asserts
that,
[a]s demonstrated
at hearing, MSHA was never denied access to the Mine and the inspector was
never told he could not inspect[,] . . . [and t]herefore, issuing a citation pursuant to Section 103(a) was
contrary to the Mine Act as it was obvious that the inspector was never denied
entry to the Mine, [and] he was not unduly delayed on the date of his
inspection.
Id. at 7. Noting that the
“burden is on the Secretary to establish that his position in this case was
substantially justified in law and fact or that special circumstances make an
award unjust,” Portable asserts that MSHA’s enforcement action was not
substantially justified. Id.
Although Portable acknowledges that section
103(a) explicitly provides for an inspector’s right to conduct an inspection, it
replies that Portable never contended otherwise and it asserts that there was
never any direct or indirect denial of that right. Application
at 8. A fair contention, Portable asserts that when the weakness of MSHA’s
claim became apparent, the Secretary added the alternative claim of advance
warning. Id. at 10.
The Secretary’s
Objection to Portable’s Application
Applying the standard for reviewing
EAJA claims, the Secretary maintains that its position was based on “sound
legal reasoning and factual support.” Objection at 6. He
argues that unreasonable delay of an inspection comes within the proscription
of interference of a mine inspection. The Secretary characterizes the events
associated with this matter as an “indirect denial.” Id. at 7. As framed by the
Secretary, “[t]he question before the Court was whether that delay was
unreasonable, rising to the level of impeding the inspection.”[2]
Id.
It is true that the Court held that a
thirty minute delay could constitute
impeding in violation of section 103(a), and that, in finding no delay here, it
limited its holding to the particular facts. However, the Secretary goes on to
assert that
[a]fter weighing the evidence and making credibility
determinations, the Court disagreed with the Secretary as to those facts and
their impact, but that does not mean the Secretary’s position was not
substantially justified[, and that g]iven these facts
and the governing law which had not yet dealt with the particularities at issue
here, “reasonable people could genuinely differ.”
Id. at 8.
This characterization seeks more than is
warranted. The analysis is not simply a matter of observing that there was a 30
minute delay and then coupling that with the observation that the law has not
yet dealt with “the particularities at issue here.” One has to examine all that
went on during the time from the inspector’s arrival up to the point that he
began his inspection, as those circumstances inform whether there was in fact
an unreasonable delay. As the Court’s decision clearly set forth, under the
particular circumstances, there was no unreasonable delay.
The essence of the Secretary’s
argument asserts that it was the Court’s conclusion “that the evidence did not
adequately show Portable’s intent to impede the inspection [and that] [t]he
Court’s conclusions were based largely on its credibility findings and its view
of the import of the evidence.” Id. at 9. Discounting that the Bellfi
did not inform Portable that he had a legal right to conduct an inspection, the
Secretary apparently believed it was sufficient for the inspector to “announce that
he was an MSHA Inspector and that he was present to conduct an inspection.” Id. He adds that “[t]here is no legal
requirement that an inspector use any particular words in announcing his right
and presence to inspect.” Id. From
this, the Secretary urges that “any failure to expressly announce the statutory
basis for [the inspector’s] legal authority does not detract from the fact that
the Secretary’s position was substantially justified.”[3]
Id. at 9-10.
Noting that the “Court concluded that
Portable did not definitively tell Bellfi that he could not inspect the mine,”
the Secretary asserts that Portable did this indirectly by pointing to Bellfi’s testimony that he “normally waits five minutes
before proceeding with his inspection.” Id. at 10. A long stretch, the Secretary contends that Bellfi’s failure to start his inspection within his normal
five minute wait “evidence[s] his view that he was being barred from inspecting
without an escort.” Id. The Secretary
then adds that “Bellfi also testified
that he told Edwards that the longer he had to wait,
the more likely he would be to issue a citation for impeding the inspection.” Id. However, this observation undercuts
the Secretary’s claim of impedance, because it shows that at that point in time
Bellfi acknowledged that no impeding had yet occurred.
The Secretary would have it that he “was
entitled to rely upon the statements, observations and opinions of an
experienced mine inspector, and could not have anticipated that the Court would
credit Portable’s witnesses rather than the inspector’s[,]”
again describing any finding of EAJA liability as simply grounded upon credibility
findings. Id. at
10. As explained below, the Court’s conclusions did not rest only on
credibility findings but on the testimony from MSHA’s own witnesses, which
significantly undercut the claim that there had been an impeding of the
inspection.
The Secretary further contends that
Portable asserts “that it is automatically entitled to an award because the
Secretary’s ‘enforcement position [] is the subject of an internal disagreement
within the agency.’” Surreply at 1. Addressing that contention, the Secretary points out
that
Supervisor Petty
testified that his internal office procedure is for inspectors to contact him
prior to issuing a citation for impeding, and noted that he has waited for
15-20 minutes at Portable for Ms. Rather to walk around with him. But he also
stated that an inspector has the right to inspect immediately upon arrival, and
did not opine that the citation issued here was improper.
Id. The Secretary
then observes that
this Court
stated in its decision that a thirty minute delay could constitute impeding an
inspection in violation of section 103(a) of the Mine Act[,
adding that t]here simply was no internal dispute within the agency of the type
at issue in Black Diamond
Construction, 21 FMSHRC 1188 (1998) and [accordingly
the Secretary urges that] Portable’s argument on this issue must be rejected.
Id. at 1-2.
Discussion
Having considered the parties’ arguments,
and upon applying the applicable standard for determining Portable’s
eligibility for an EAJA award, the Court finds that the Secretary was not
substantially justified in bringing an action under section 103(a) of the Mine
Act in this instance.
As noted, MSHA contended that Portable
unreasonably delayed the inspection, in violation of section 103(a) of the Mine
Act, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a).[4]
While the Court agrees with the Secretary that, as a general principle, the
section is violated if a mine operator unreasonably
delays the start of an inspection by denying the inspector access to the
mine, the issue here is whether, in the context of the findings of fact, there
was an unreasonable delay in this instance.
The length of the delay was minimal. Although
the Secretary’s civil penalty petition alleges that the MSHA’s inspection “was
delayed by approximately one-half hour,” and that the Court stated that a delay
of 30 minutes, or possibly less time, could constitute an interference with the
right to inspect, it cannot be ignored that the delay here was minimal and,
realistically measured, was far less than 30 minutes.
It is true that the delay stemmed from
the operator’s claim that a safety escort was needed to accompany the inspector,
but that is not the entire measure of ascertaining whether the Secretary was
substantially justified in bringing this action. For a significant period of
time the inspector acceded to the basis for the delay. To begin, although the
inspector told employee Eric Edwards that he was ready to start the inspection
and advised that he did not need to sign in, he still agreed to go to the front
office to obtain an escort. Importantly, the inspector did not then tell
Edwards that he had the right to inspect the mine
without an escort, nor did he advise that a citation could be issued for
denying him access to the mine. Instead, he told Edwards that the longer it
took to obtain an escort, the more inclined he was to issue a citation for
impeding the inspection. But that stance meant that the inspector was not then
announcing that his inspection would commence forthwith. Accordingly, the clock
for measuring any claim of an unreasonable delay could not have started at that
time. In fact, Bellfi told Edwards that he would “go
ahead and wait downstairs for [Edwards] to get an escort.” Portable, 36 FMSHRC at 3251. Approximately
20 minutes then elapsed and it was only then that he informed Edwards that he
had waited “longer than necessary” and that he was going to issue a section
103(a) citation for impeding his inspection. Id. “Edwards’ response was that Ms. Rather advised that the inspector
could start his inspection by himself.” Id. at 3. Accordingly, when the inspector announced that he
would wait no longer, the Respondent immediately accepted his demand. Thus, a
key part of the analysis is that rather than proceeding with his inspection,
the inspector went along with the delay and, when he decided he would wait no
longer, Portable did nothing to stall or interfere with that decision. Restated,
when the inspector advised that no additional delay would be allowed, he was immediately
advised by Jennifer Rather, Safety Director, via the dispatcher,
that the inspection could commence without an escort. Id.
Because the inspector was pacified up to
that point in time, which was approximately 20 minutes later, when Edwards came
back, Portable’s response from Ms. Rather that the inspector could start his
inspection by himself demonstrates both that there was no unreasonable delay and
that the Secretary’s position, under
these particular facts, was not substantially justified. This is because
that was the first point in time when the inspector made an unqualified
assertion of the right to inspect and it was then that the Respondent
immediately acceded to the start of the inspection, as Edwards’ response was
that Ms. Rather advised that the inspector could start his inspection by
himself. Therefore, the delay was minimal to non-existent, once the inspector
insisted that the inspection occur.
Other testimony of record only serves to
confirm the correctness of this conclusion that the Secretary was not
substantially justified in bringing the section 103(a) action. Inspector Bellfi informed that, prior to becoming an MSHA Conference
and Litigation Representative, at a time “when he used to conduct MSHA mine
inspections on a full-time basis, he would generally wait about 5 minutes for
an escort.” Portable,
36 FMSHRC at 3251. He advised that if an escort was not present within
that period of time, he would begin the inspection and tell mine personnel that
the escort could meet up with him. Id.
Yet, in this instance he did not follow his own announced practice. Instead, he
accepted the brief delay. In fact, he advised that “he was trained to allow
time for an operator to get a mine representative to accompany him during an
inspection, as long as doing so did not unduly delay the inspection.” Id. at 3252. But,
the Court observes that a mine operator must not be left to guess when, by
Inspector Bellfi’s particular lights, undue delay
would be deemed to have occurred.
Thus, it was Bellfi’s
view that Portable was in violation of section 103(a) of the Act because it
refused to allow him to inspect the mine by telling him that he needed an
escort to enter mine property, and thereafter failing to provide one for 30
minutes, before then allowing him to begin his inspection without an escort. While
that could be true in the abstract, in this instance the inspector did not act in
a manner which was consistent with his own professed practices. Instead, even Bellfi considered Portable’s actions to be an indirect denial of the inspection and,
by so characterizing Portable’s actions, he conceded
that they were in an enforcement gray area. Further, the inspector admitted that
he never explained to Eric Edwards, or to anyone at
Portable, that there are inspection requirements under section 103(a). This
admission does not aid the Secretary’s claim that its action was substantially
justified.
The Secretary noted that Inspector
Bellfi was “legally entitled to commence the inspection without undue delay.” Id. at 3255. But
this is a straw man argument, as the point was not disputed; both sides agreed
that an inspector is entitled to inspect without undue delay. The pertinent
issue involved the claim of indirect denial of entry. The Court found that did
not occur, while also noting that the inspector never attempted to explain his
authority, nor did he simply start his inspection. “On these facts it is clear
that the Inspector chose to wait much longer than his normal amount of time for
an escort. As he stated, he would usually start the inspection after five (5)
minutes, proceeding unaccompanied, if necessary.” Id.
Beyond these observations, the Court
noted in its decision:
There was no
testimony or documentary evidence presented by either side that Bellfi was told
that he was not permitted to inspect
the mine at any point during the 30 minute waiting period despite the
description in the citation suggesting otherwise.[5] On
the contrary, Edwards had returned to Bellfi to tell him the crusher was being
shut down and he could begin the inspection unaccompanied when Bellfi decided
to issue the citation. Further, Bellfi never told
Edwards he had a right to inspect the mine, nor did he attempt to start his
inspection despite testifying that he would normally only wait 5 minutes for an
escort before beginning. These actions also diminish the Inspector’s claim that
Portable’s actions constituted an indirect denial. In the Program Policy Manual
(PPM), a source of MSHA’s interpretation and guidelines on enforcement of the
Act, indirect denials are “those in which an operator or his agent does not
directly refuse right of entry, but takes roundabout action to prevent
inspection of the mine by interference, delays, or harassment. There must be a
clear indication of intent and proof of indirectly denying entry.” Ex. R-27 at 2. Based on the above actions taken by Portable,
the court [found] that the record does not evidence such ‘clear indication of
intent and proof of indirectly denying entry,’ and accordingly it is found that
the Respondent did not exhibit the intent to indirectly deny access or
otherwise delay the inspection.
Id. at 3255-56. The Court also
observed that
[i]n addition,
testimony from Supervisor Petty and Ms. Rather regarding past practices were
particularly enlightening. Petty had performed or accompanied hundreds of inspections
in the past, sometimes waiting 30 or more minutes for an escort before
beginning the inspection. No citations for impeding were issued as a result of
those prior wait times. Petty also explained that MSHA protocol was for
inspectors to tell mine personnel that they had a right to inspect the mine
immediately and that, after so informing, there was no timeline for issuing the
citation for impeding. There is no indication that Bellfi
did this. Ms. Rather had been present for all inspections at Portable, except
for one, prior to August 16, 2012, and she never had an issue with an inspector
waiting up to 30 minutes for her to arrive and be an escort. While a lack of past enforcement by
MSHA cannot be the sole reason for vacating this citation, the Secretary’s
previous interactions with Portable set the stage for its expectations, and was
indicative of the amount of time it considered to be a reasonable period to
wait.
Thus, it is fair to state that Portable’s past experience
with MSHA inspections led it to believe that it was acting in a manner
consistent with those experiences, and therefore that it was not thwarting any
inspection.
Id. at 3256.
Finally,
the Court took note that
[i]t is important to recognize [] the Secretary’s valid
concern that “excusing” a 30 minute delay “would severely impair MSHA’s ability
to protect miners.” . . . Under a different set of facts, intentionally and
unreasonably delaying an MSHA inspector for 30 minutes, or possibly, in some
circumstances, a delay of less time, could indeed weaken MSHA’s ability to
protect miners. Accordingly, the Court’s decision here is not meant to be
broadly interpreted but instead is limited to the specific circumstances of
this [] case.
Id. at 3259. Thus, the Court limited its decision to the record
evidence and was not making a broader assertion about acceptable delays for
inspections. It takes the same approach for this EAJA Application, ruling only
that the Secretary was not substantially justified in bringing this particular
action.
Conclusion
As noted, after the Application
was filed and the Objection to it submitted, Portable then filed a reply and the
Secretary submitted a brief surreply. The surreply reduced the issues to be resolved to the
substantial justification question, the Secretary having conceded “that
Portable is eligible for an award, as it meets the size criteria and has
incurred fees in defense of an action on which it was the prevailing party.” Surreply at 1.
Having found that the Secretary’s action was not substantially justified, the
Court awards the $65,217.82 sought by Portable.
So Ordered.
/s/ William B.
Moran
William B. Moran
Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:
Mark
N. Savit, Jackson Lewis P.C., 950 17th Street, Suite 2600, Denver, CO 80202
Donna
Vetrano Pryor, Jackson Lewis P.C., 950 17th Street, Suite 2600, Denver, CO
80202
Timothy
S. Williams, 1244 Speer Blvd., Suite 515, Denver, CO 80204-3516
[1] As an
alternative theory of liability, the Secretary much later asserted that Portable violated section 103(a)’s
prohibition against giving mine personnel advance notice of an inspection. 36 FMSHRC at 3254. This alternative claim was hollow and was
dismissed by the Court. Id.
at 3258. The only theory worthy of discussion in this EAJA matter is the
issue of whether the Secretary was substantially justified in pursuing its
claim that the inspector was unreasonably delayed in beginning his inspection,
running afoul of the right to conduct such inspections of mine property.
[2] Although the Secretary
notes that, while the Court concluded that the delay was not unreasonable and
that it did not rise to the level of impeding the inspection, he contends that
this conclusion was reached through the process of the Court’s evaluation of
the evidence, by drawing inferences and conclusions and making credibility
determinations. He asserts that simply because the Court’s conclusions were
different than the Secretary’s does not mean that his case was not substantially
justified. Objection at 7. As explained in this
decision, the Court does not agree that the matter can be so described as merely
different takes on the same evidence.
[3] The Secretary also
adds that the inspector’s failure to first contact a supervisor does not
diminish that there was substantial justification because such a requirement
was not an established MSHA policy. Objection at 9-10.
[4] As an alternative theory of liability, the Secretary asserts that Portable violated section 103(a)’s prohibition against giving mine personnel advance notice of an inspection.” Portable, 36 FMSHRC at 3249. “It was not until after the inspection that Bellfi determined that such safety corrections could have been made during the time that he was waiting for an escort. It was such afterthoughts that prompted MSHA’s alternative theory of liability, that Portable gave advance notice of the inspection.” Id. at 3252.
[5] As the Court
noted at footnote 9 in its December 2014 decision, “[t]his is distinguishable
from the facts in F.R. Carroll where
the inspector repeatedly asked the operator to allow him to proceed with the
inspection, and told mine personnel that a 5 hour delay could not be granted. F.R. Carroll, 26 FMSHRC at 102.