<DOC>
[DOCID: f:ct2000114.wais]

 
CHRISMAN READY-MIX INCORPORATED
October 26, 2000
CENT 2000-114-M


            FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

                  OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                         2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
                           5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                     FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA  22041


                            October 26, 2000

SECRETARY OF LABOR,              :  CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
  MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH         :
  ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),         :  Docket No. CENT 2000-114-M
               Petitioner        :  A. C. No. 03-01597-05511
          v.                     :
                                 :  Clarksville Quarry
CHRISMAN READY-MIX,              :
  INCORPORATED,                  :
               Respondent        :

                             DECISION

Appearances:  David Q. Jones, Esq., Tina Campos, Law Clerk,
              Office  of  the Solicitor, U.S. Department of
              Labor, Dallas, Texas, for the Petitioner;
              Lonnie C. Turner,  Esq.,  Turner  &  Mainard,
              Ozark, Arkansas, for the Respondent.

Before:  Judge Feldman

     This proceeding concerns a petition for assessment of  civil
penalties filed by the  Secretary  of  Labor (the Secretary) 
against the respondent, Chrisman Ready-Mix, Inc., pursuant to 
section 110(a)  of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 
(the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. � 820(a).  The petition  sought to im-
pose a total civil penalty of $571.00 for nine alleged  violations
of the mandatory safety standards in 30 C.F.R. Part 56 of the  
Secretary's regulations governing surface mines. Only one of 
the nine alleged violative   conditions was characterized as
significant  and substantial (S&S) in nature.[1]  This matter 
was heard on October 3, 2000, in Fayetteville, Arkansas.

     At the beginning of the  hearing,  the  parties were advised
that I would defer my ruling on the nine citations  pending post-
hearing briefs, or, issue a bench decision if the parties  waived
their right to file post-hearing briefs.  The parties waived  the
filing of briefs.  (Tr. 58-60).  This written decision formalizes
the  bench  decision issued with respect to five of the contested
non-S&S citations.   The  bench  decision vacated three citations
and affirmed two citations. During  the  course of the hearing, I
approved the parties' settlement agreement  with  respect  to the
remaining  four citations, including the citation that designated
the cited violation  as  S&S.   With  respect to the four settled
citations, the respondent agreed to pay  a total civil penalty of
$237.00 consisting of a reduced $44.00 civil  penalty for each of
three non-S&S citations, and a reduced $105.00  civil penalty for
the S&S violation.  A total civil penalty of $64.00  was  imposed
for  the  two citations that were affirmed at the hearing.  Thus,
the total civil  penalty  imposed  in  this matter, including the
$237.00 the respondent agreed to pay, is  $301.00.   This written
bench decision is an edited version of the bench decision  issued
at trial with added references to pertinent case law.

     The  bench  decision  applied  the  statutory  civil penalty
criteria  in  section  110(i) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. � 820(i),  to
determine the appropriate  civil penalty to be assessed.  Section
110(i) provides, in pertinent part, in assessing civil penalties:

     the Commission shall consider the operator's history of
     previous  violations,  the   appropriateness   of  such
     penalty  to  the  size  of the business of the operator
     charged, whether the operator was negligent, the effect
     on the operator's ability  to continue in business, the
     gravity  of the violation, and  the  demonstrated  good
     faith of the  person  charged  in attempting to achieve
     rapid compliance after notification of a violation.

     The respondent, Chrisman Ready-Mix,  Inc.,  is  a small mine
operator  that  is  subject to the jurisdiction of the Mine  Act.
The evidence reflects  that  the respondent has a good compliance
history with respect to previous  violations in that it was cited
for  only  seven  violations  of  mandatory   health  and  safety
standards during the previous four years preceding  the  issuance
of the citations in issue (Ex. P-12); that the respondent  abated
the  cited  conditions in a timely manner; that the $571.00 total
civil penalty  initially proposed by the Secretary in this matter
will not effect the respondent's ability to continue in business;
and that the contested  non-S&S citations involve conditions that
were not serious in gravity.   In  this  regard, the parties have
stipulated to the small size of the respondent  operator,  to the
fact that the civil penalties in this matter will not impair  its
ability  to  continue  in  business, and to the respondent's good
compliance history.  (Tr. 133).

     I. Findings and Conclusions

     Chrisman Ready-Mix, Inc.,  is a small mine operator that has
five  employees  at  its  Clarksville  quarry.   At  the  quarry,
material is extracted from  a rock bluff and crushed into various
grades  of  gravel.   The gravel  is  used  by  the  construction
industry  for  such  purposes  as  road  construction,  concrete,
roofing  gravel  and  the  installation  of  septic  tanks.   The
citations that are the  subject of this proceeding were issued on
October 13, 1999, by Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)
Inspector Robert Capps, who  is  assigned  to  the  Little  Rock,
Arkansas  Field  Office.   The  citations  were issued during the
course  of his regular bi-yearly inspection of  the  respondent's
Clarksville facility.

     A. Citation No. 7883242

     During  the  course  of  inspector  Capps' October 13, 1999,
inspection,  Capps  entered  the scale house  which  is  a  small
building that houses the mechanical  and electronic components of
the truck scale that is used to weigh  customer  loads.   In  the
scale  house, Capps noted a surge protector that was connected to
various pieces of mechanical equipment.  Generally speaking,
a surge protector has a power cable that is connected to the plug
on one end, and to the surge protector compartment containing the
outlet receptacles on the other end.  The power cable has a thick
outer jacket  that  prevents electric shock from contact with the
interior copper wires.   Inside  the  thick  outer  jacket  is  a
thinner inner rubber coated jacket that prevents the copper wires
from  touching  each  other  and shorting out.  The thinner inner
rubber  coated  jacket,  like the  outer  jacket,  also  provides
protection from electric shock injury.

     Capps  determined  the  surge  protector  cable  had  become
separated  at  the  plug end  of  the  cord  exposing  the  inner
protective  rubber  sheathing  that  surrounds  the  copper  wire
conductors.  Capps estimated the separation distance of the outer
protective cable from the plug to be approximately 1/2 inch.  Steve
Hurt, the respondent's  crusher  foreman, estimated the cable had
separated from the plug a distance  of  approximately  1/8  inch.
The outer protective layer of the power cable apparently had worn
and had become slightly disconnected from the plug over time as a
result repeatedly pulling the cable to disconnect  the  plug from
the electrical outlet.

     As  a result of his observations, Capps issued Citation  No.
7883242 for an alleged violation of the mandatory safety standard
in section  56.12004  that  requires,  in  pertinent  part,  that
electrical  conductors  exposed  to  mechanical  damage  shall be
protected.  30 C.F.R. � 56.12004.  (Ex. P-1).  The citation was 
abated by removing  the surge   protector   from  service.   Capps
concluded  the  cited violation was not S&S because the cooper wire
conductors were not exposed, and the remaining  inner  rubber  
sheathing  afforded  a measure  of  protection  against  the electric
shock hazard.  The Secretary seeks to impose a civil penalty of 
$55.00 for Citation No. 7883242.

     As  a  threshold matter, the bench  decision  addressed  the
respondent's assertion that the scale house, despite its location
on mine property, is not a mine subject to Mine Act jurisdiction.
The bench decision  noted  the  definition of a "mine" in section
3(h)(1) of the Act is "sweeping,"  and  "expansive."  Marshall v.
Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d  589,  591-92  (3rd Cir.
1979),  cert.  denied,  444  U.S.  1015  (1980).   Under  section
3(h)(1),  a "mine" includes "lands, . . . structures, facilities,
equipment, machines, tools or other property . . . used in, or to
be used in, . . . the work  of  preparing  .  .  .  minerals."   30
U.S.C. � 802(h)(1).   In  view  of  the  expansive nature of the 
statutory language in section 3(h)(1), it is  clear that the scale 
house is subject to Mine Act jurisdiction.

     Notwithstanding its jurisdictional objection, the respondent
contends that the citation is defective  because Capps issued the
citation during the early morning of October 13, 1999, before  
mining activities occurred.  However,  an  inspector  may cite a 
violation based on his reconstruction of past events.  Put another
way, an inspector does not have to personally observe a violation
of a mandatory  safety  standard  to  conclude  that  a violation
had  occurred.  Emerald Mines Co. v. FMSHRC, 863 F. 2d 51, 57 (D.C.
Cir.  1988).   In  this instance, it was appropriate for Capps to 
conclude that the cited  violative  condition,  that apparently 
occurred over a period of time as a result of pulling the plug of 
the  power  cable from the electrical outlet, existed during mining
operations for a substantial period preceding Capps' October 13, 1999,
inspection.

     Weighing  Capps'  testimony  that  the  cable  had separated
approximately  1/2  inch,  and Hurt's testimony that the cable  had
separated approximately  1/8  inch, I conclude that the damage to
the cable was somewhere in between at a distance of approximately
1/4 inch.  However slight, the  damaged  cable  did  compromise the
protection of the electrical conductors that is required  by  the
cited   mandatory   standard.   Accordingly,  the  Secretary  has
established the fact  of  the  violation  cited  in  Citation No.
7883242.

     With  respect  to  the negligence associated with the  cited
violation, I view the 1/4 inch  damage  to  the cable as de minimis
and difficult to detect.  Thus, there is virtually  no negligence
to be attributed to the respondent.  However, "[t]he  Mine Act is
a strict liability statute and an operator may be held liable for
violations without regard to fault."  Wyoming Fuel Co.,
16 FMSHRC 19, 21 (January 1994).  The Secretary proposes a $55.00
civil penalty for this non-S&S  violation. While I recognize  that
even  de minimis violations have the potential to cause serious 
injury, the civil penalty for Citation No.  7883242 shall be reduced
to $20.00 in  recognition  of  the  low  gravity, the obscure 
nature of the cited condition, and the absence of  negligence.  
(Tr. 70-74).

     B. Citation No. 7883245

     During the course of his inspection,  Capps  observed  a wet
wash  screening  plant  used  to  clean  rock material that had a
ladder  approximately eight feet in length  leaning  against  the
metal structure.   The  ladder  provided  a  means of access to a
horizontal metal frame that could be used as a walkway to service
or  observe the screening facility.  The horizontal  metal  frame
was approximately  six to eight feet above ground level depending
on the amount of spilled  rock material on the ground.  There was
an  unguarded  v-belt located  approximately  twelve  feet  above
ground level and  four feet above the metal frame walkway.  Capps
noted spilled material  on the surface of the metal frame.  Capps
was concerned that if someone used the ladder to access the metal
frame walkway while the wash  screen  was  in operation, he could
slip or fall, and, in so doing, he could contact  the moving belt
and pulley.

     Based on his observations, Capps issued Citation No. 7883245
alleging a non-S&S violation of the mandatory safety  standard in
section  56.14107(a)  that  requires  moving  pulleys and similar
pinch points to be guarded to protect against injury.   30 C.F.R.
� 56.14107(a). (Ex.  P-4). Capps concluded the cited condition was
non-S&S because he was told employees did not access the metal frame
walkway when the washer screen was operating. Although  Capps  cited
the condition  as  a  section 56.14107(a) violation that requires
the guarding of moving parts, the citation was abated by removing
the  ladder  from  the metal frame. (Tr. 98-101). Capps admitted 
the metal walkway was  not frequently traveled. He also testified
the only time the ladder would be used to access the walkway was 
to perform maintenance such as greasing and repairing  gear  boxes.
Capps conceded his primary concern was that the washer screen must
be  de-energized prior  to  performing  maintenance  as  required 
by   the   mandatory   safety   standard   in   section  56.12016.
30 C.F.R. � 56.12016.

     The bench decision noted that section  56.14107(b)  provides
that  the  guarding  requirements  of  section 56.14107(a) do not
apply where the exposed moving parts are at least seven feet away
from walking or working surfaces.  Here  the  cited  unguarded v-
belt  is  approximately  12  feet  above  the ground.  Thus,  the
question is whether the exception in section 56.14107(b) applies.
The Secretary  finds herself in the unenviable  position  of  as-
serting  that  guarding  is  required despite  permitting abatement
of the citation  without  requiring the installation of guarding.

     In determining  whether the guarding requirements of section
56.14107(a) apply, the focus must be on the regulation's language
that the unguarded condition must be one that "can cause injury."
While  the  Secretary is  normally  entitled  to  deference  when
interpreting her own mandatory safety standards, deference cannot
be accorded to  the  Secretary's  interpretation if it is plainly
wrong and inconsistent with the purpose  of the cited regulation.
Dolese Brothers Co., 16 FMSHRC 689, 693 (April 1994) (quoting Emery
Mining Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir. 
1984).

     In addressing  the  question of when guarding is required by
the safety standard, it is helpful to examine the  Commission's  
decision  in  Thomas Brothers Coal Company, 6 FMSHRC  2094  (Septem-
ber  1984)  that  addressed the purpose of section 77.400(a), a 
similar  mandatory guarding standard governing coal mining.  The 
Commission stated:

     We find the most  logical construction of the  standard is 
     that it  imports  the concepts of reasonable possibility of 
     contact and injury, including  contact stemming from  inad-
     vertent stumbling or  falling,  momentary inattention or 
     ordinary carelessness.  Applying this test requires taking 
     into  consideration all relevant exposure and  injury variables.
     For example, accessibility of  the machine parts, work areas,
     ingress and egress,  work duties, and as noted, the vagaries 
     of human  conduct. Under this approach, citations for inade-
     quate guarding  will  be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

6 FMSHRC at 2097.

     Thus, stumbling and inadvertent  contact  are  the  concerns
that  the  standard  addresses.  The standard is not intended  to
require  moving  parts  to   be   guarded  in  order  to  prevent
intentional contact by maintenance  personnel  who  have  used  a
ladder to access a walkway that is used for the exclusive purpose
of  performing  maintenance  or  repair.   Of  course maintenance
personnel must de-energize the washer screen prior  to  accessing
the  walkway.   The  Secretary  has  the  burden  of  proving the
occurrence  of  a  violation.   Here it appears that Capps'  real
concern  was  that  equipment  must  be   de-energized  prior  to
maintenance.  The Secretary cannot prevail  in  a  case  where it
cites  an  operator  for  a  failure  to  install  guarding while
permitting abatement of the citation without the installation  of
guarding.   Accordingly,  Citation  No. 7883245 shall be vacated.
(Tr. 104-09).

     C. Citation No. 7883247

     Capps'  inspection  included   determining   if   all   fire
extinguishers  had  been  visually  checked on a monthly basis to
ensure that they were fully charged and  operable  as required by
the  mandatory  safety standard in section 56.4201(a)(1).   Capps
noted two fire extinguishers  that  were hanging on walls on mine
property that had neither been timely  checked,  nor taken out of
service.   The  tags on the subject fire extinguishers  reflected
one was last checked  in  April  1999  and  the  other  was  last
visually  inspected in August 1999.  As a result of his findings,
Capps issued Citation No. 7883247 citing a non-S&S violation of  
section 56.4201(a)(1).  30 C.F.R. � 56.4201(a)(1).   (Ex.  P-6). 
Capps designated the violation as non-S&S because the cited  fire
extinguishers  appeared to be in good working condition. The  re-
spondent  asserts the fire extinguishers were in a shed awaiting 
service.

     The  bench  decision  noted  that,  to  be  enforceable, the
monthly visual inspection requirements section 56.4201(a)(1) must
be  read  in  conjunction  with section 56.4201(b) that  requires
written dated certification  by  the  person  making  the  visual
inspection.    In   the   absence   of  evidence  that  the  fire
extinguishers were taken out of service  by  storing  them  at  a
location   where   functioning   fire   extinguishers  would  not
ordinarily be kept, I have no alternative  but  to  conclude that
the fire extinguishers were not removed from service.   Moreover,
this  conclusion  is  consistent  with inspector Capps' testimony
that the fire extinguishers were in  good  working condition.  In
view of  Capps' testimony that the majority of fire extinguishers
had been visually inspected on a monthly basis, I am reducing the
respondent's   degree  of  negligence  from  moderate   to   low.
Accordingly, Citation  No.  7883247  is  affirmed  and  the civil
penalty imposed is reduced from $55.00 to $44.00.  (Tr. 124-26).

     D. Citation No. 7883248

     Capps  observed the power cord for the No. 2 conveyor  motor
had been sliced  with  what  he  considered to be a thin layer of
electrical tape.  The cord was located  on  the  east side of the
conveyor near the head pulley at a location where  the top of the
conveyor is approximately 15 feet from the ground.  The spliced 
area of the power cable was approximately  ten  feet  off  the  
ground. Capps noted that electrical  plastic  or  vinyl  tape  was
used to accomplish the splice rather than thicker rubberized elec-
trical  tape.  However, Capps  conceded  that  because the cable 
was suspended  ten  feet above ground, he could not  determine the
adhesion of the tape or the extent to which the tape  was  wound 
around the cable.  As a result  of  his observations, Capps issued
Citation No. 7883248 citing a violation  of  section  56.12013.  
30 C.F.R. � 56.12013. (Ex. P-7). This standard requires  that  
splices  and repairs to power   cables  must  be  "mechanically  
strong  with  electrical conductivity  as  near as possible to that
of the original."  The standard  also  requires  damage  protection 
and  resistance  to moisture equal to  that  of  the  original.  
Capps designated the violation as non-S&S because the location of
the splice ten feet above ground level was not likely to cause injury.

     The  bench  decision  noted  that due process  requires  the
Secretary to establish, by a preponderance  of  the evidence, the
fact of a violation.  Here Capps' observations of the spliced area
of a cable suspended ten feet in the  air  occurred approximately 
one year ago. As distinguished from several of the other cited vio-
lations where photographs have been admitted depicting the condi-
tions, there is no  photograph   of  the  splice  to  judge  whether
the  splice approaches  the  functionality  of  the original cable
jacket. Although rubberized  electrical  tape  is thicker than 
plastic or vinyl electrical tape, it has neither been  contended  
nor  shown that  splicing  with  plastic  or  vinyl tape violates 
electrical industry   standards.   The  regulatory   standard   in
section 56.12013(a)   requires   that   the  splice  must  provide 
equal protection "as near as possible to that of the original [cable]."
The protective capability of the  splice  is  a  function  of the
adhesion  quality  of  the  tape  as  well  as its thickness.  On
balance,  Capps'  testimony, based on his observations  from  the
ground,  does not adequately  demonstrate  that  the  amount  and
condition  of  the  electrical tape used to accomplish the splice
resulted in the requisite  diminution  of protection contemplated
by section 56.12013(a).  Accordingly, Citation  No. 7883248 shall
be vacated.  (Tr. 153-56).

     E. Citation No. 7883250

     Capps observed the primary jaw crusher.  A photograph of the
crusher  was  admitted  at trial.  (Ex. P-11).  The  crusher  was
driven by a horizontal drive  belt  located approximately 12 feet
above  ground  level.    (Tr.  172-74;  Ex.   P-11).   Capps  was
concerned that, if the belt snapped, it could fly off the pulleys
causing  injury  to  anyone  traveling  in  the vicinity  of  the
crusher.   However,  Capps testified that there  was  "[n]o  real
evidence of foot traffic  .  .  . its a low traffic area normally
during crusher hours."  (Tr. 177).   Capps  testified that he was
not aware of  any  previous  injuries  that  had occurred as  a  
result  of circumstances and conditions that were  similar to the 
conditions that he observed at respondent's primary jaw crusher. Id.

     As a result of his observations, Capps  issued  Citation No.
7883250  citing  an  alleged  violation  of  the mandatory safety
standard  in  section  56.14108.   30  C.F.R.  � 56.14108.   This
regulatory standard states:

     Overhead  drive  belts  shall  be guarded  to contain the whip-
     ping action of a  broken belt if that action could be hazard-
     ous to persons. (Emphasis added).

     Capps designated the cited condition as  non-S&S because, as
previously noted, there was "no real evidence of foot traffic" in
the area.  (Tr. 177).  The citation was abated  by  installing  a
horizontal metal bar under the drive belt.  Capps opined that the
metal bar would reduce the velocity of the belt if it broke.

     The  bench  decision  noted  that  the provisions of section
56.14108 do not require the guarding of all overhead drive belts 
to "to contain whipping action."   Rather,  there  is a condition
precedent  for  section 56.14108 to apply.  Namely, guarding is 
required only if a broken  belt "could be hazardous  to  persons."
The  degree  of potential  hazard  to  persons is a function of the
height of the drive belt and the amount  of  foot traffic in the 
area.  In this case, the belt is approximately  12  feet  above the 
ground in an area  with "no real evidence" of foot traffic. (Tr. 177).
In fact, the  degree of hazard was sufficiently remote for inspector
Capps to conclude  that  it  was  unlikely  that  an injury would
result because of the cited condition.

     Section 56.14108 is a broad regulatory standard that applies
to overhead drive belts on a case-by-case basis depending on whether 
the failure to guard the drive belt could pose a hazard to persons.
In applying broad regulatory provisions, the Commission looks to 
whether "a   reasonably   prudent   person   familiar  with  the  
factual circumstances  surrounding  the  allegedly  hazardous  con-
dition, including  any  facts  peculiar  to the  mining  industry,
would recognize  a  hazard  warranting  corrective  action  within
the purview  of  the  applicable  regulation."   Alabama  By-Products
Corp., 4 FMSHRC 2128, 2129 (December 1982).

     While  the  Secretary  is  not  estopped  from  citing  this
condition simply because the condition  had  not  been cited as a
violation during the past nine years of MSHA inspections  at  the
respondent's  Clarksville  facility,  the failure of MSHA to cite
this  condition  in  the  past  is  material   in   applying  the
"reasonably prudent person" test.  In addition, the height of the
subject  drive  belt 12 feet above the ground, the lack  of  foot
traffic in the area  of  the  crusher,  and Capps' admission that
injury was unlikely, all support the conclusion that a reasonably
prudent person familiar with the mining industry  would  not have
recognized  the presence of a hazard requiring corrective action.
Accordingly,  the  Secretary  has failed to satisfy her burden of
proving  the  fact  of the cited    section  56.14108  violation.
Consequently, Citation No. 7883250 shall be vacated.


**FOOTNOTES**

     [1]: A violation  of a mandatory safety standard is properly
characterized as S&S if it is reasonably likely that the hazard  
contributed to by the violation will result in an event, i.e., an
accident,  resulting  in serious injury.   U.S.  Steel Mining Co.,
6 FMSHRC 1834, 1836 (August 1984). 

     F. The Settlement Agreement

     As previously noted, at the hearing  the  parties  agreed to
settle  four  of  the  citations  that  were  in  issue  in  this
proceeding  for  a total civil penalty of $237.00.  Specifically,
the respondent agreed  to  pay  a  reduced total civil penalty of
$132.00 consisting of three $44.00 civil  penalties  for Citation
Nos. 7883243, 7883244 and 7883249 that cited, respectively,  non-
S&S  violations for a missing circuit breaker in the scale house,
a failure  to  identify  circuit  breakers  located  in the scale
house, and a failure to have a weather resistant cover  plate  on
the  J-box  motor  of  the  primary  feed conveyor.  Finally, the
respondent  agreed  to pay a reduced $105.00  civil  penalty  for
Citation  No.  7883246   that  cited  an  S&S  violation  for  an
electrical control cable that  was improperly installed through a
hole in the frame of an aluminum window.


                              ORDER

     In  view  of the above, IT IS  ORDERED  THAT  Citation  Nos.
7883245, 7883248 and 7883250 ARE VACATED.

     IT IS FURTHER  ORDERED THAT the respondent shall pay a total
civil penalty of $64.00  in satisfaction of Citation Nos. 7883242
and 7883247 that ARE AFFIRMED.

     IT  IS  FURTHER  ORDERED  THAT,  pursuant  to  the  parties'
agreement, the respondent  shall  pay  a  total  civil penalty of
$237.00  in  satisfaction  of  Citation  Nos.  7883243,  7883244,
7883246 and 7883249.

     Accordingly, the respondent shall pay a total  civil penalty
of $301.00 within 45 days
of  the  date of this decision.  Upon timely receipt of  payment,
Docket No. WEVA 2000-114-M
IS DISMISSED.


                              Jerold Feldman
                              Administrative Law Judge


Distribution:

David Q. Jones,  Esq.,  Tina  Campos,  Law  Clerk,  Office of the
Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 525 South Griffin St., Suite
501, Dallas, TX 75202 (Certified Mail)

Lonnie  C.  Turner,  Turner & Mainard, Attorneys at Law,  110  W.
Commercial, Ozark, AR 72949 (Certified Mail)

/mh