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[DOCID: f:ct2001366.wais]

 
PEA RIDGE IRON ORE COMPANY, INC.
September 28, 2001
CENT 2001-366-D


        FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

               OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                      2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
                       5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                  FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA  22041

                       September 28, 2001

SECRETARY OF LABOR,              : TEMPORARY REINSTATEMENT
   MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH        :   PROCEEDING
   ADMINISTRATION, (MSHA),       :
   on behalf of                  : Docket No. CENT 2001-366-D
   WILLIAM C. ALLEN              :
               Complainant       : SC MD 01-11
          v.                     :
PEA RIDGE IRON ORE COMPANY, INC.,:
               Respondent        :
                                 : Mine: Pea Ridge Iron Ore Co.
                                 : Mine ID 23-00454

          ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY REINSTATEMENT

Before:  Judge Bulluck

     This matter is before me  upon  application,  filed  by  the
Secretary on August 2, 2001, pursuant to section 105(c)(2) of the
Federal  Mine  Safety  and  Health  Act  of  1977,  30  U.S.C.
�815(c)(2),  for  an  order requiring Pea Ridge Iron Ore Company,
Inc. ("Pea Ridge") to temporarily  reinstate William Allen to his
former  position as a long hole drill  operator/blaster   at  its
mine, or  to a similar position at the same rate of pay, with the
same or equivalent duties.  Section 105(c)(2) prohibits operators
from discharging  or  otherwise discriminating against miners who
have engaged in safety related protected activity, and authorizes
the  Secretary  to  apply   to   the   Commission  for  temporary
reinstatement of miners, pending full resolution of the merits of
their complaints.  The application is supported by declaration of
Ronald  M.  Mesa, Mine Safety and Health Administration  ("MSHA")
special investigator  assigned  to  the  Dallas,  Texas  District
Office, and a copy of the discrimination complaint filed by Allen
with MSHA on February 27, 2001.[1]  The application alleges  that
Allen  was  terminated  from  employment  by Pea Ridge because of
safety concerns Allen had raised with MSHA  inspectors  during an
escapeways inspection of the mine.

     Pea Ridge elected not to request a hearing and on August 27,
2001,  filed its Opposition to the application, with declarations
of Pea Ridge  employees Thomas Gallagher (with attachments), Jeff
Sumpter, Jim Reed, Jr., and Dennis Lafferty, therein denying that
Pea Ridge had discriminated  against  Allen  and  asserting  that
Allen  was  discharged  for  violating the company's drug policy.
The Secretary filed her Response,  with  supplemental declaration
of  Special  Investigator Mesa, on August 31,  2001.   Pea  Ridge
filed its Reply on September 10, 2001.


     Procedural Framework

     The scope  of  this proceeding is governed by the provisions
of Commission Rule 45(c), 29 C.F.R. �2700.45(c), which limits the
inquiry to a "not frivolously brought" standard by providing that
"If no hearing is requested,  the Judge assigned the matter shall
review immediately the Secretary's  application  and, if based on
the  contents  thereof  the  Judge  determines  that the  miner's
complaint was not frivolously brought, he shall issue immediately
a written order of temporary reinstatement."

     It  is  well  settled  that  the  "not frivolously  brought"
standard is entirely different from the  scrutiny applicable to a
trial  on the merits of the underlying discrimination  complaint.
In Jim Walter Resources v. FMSHRC, 920 F.2d 738 (11th Cir. 1990),
the Court explained the standard as follows:

          The  legislative  history  of  the Act defines the
     `not   frivolously  brought  standard'  as   indicating
     whether  a  miner's `complaint appears to have merit'--
     an interpretation  that  is  strikingly  similar  to  a
     reasonable  cause  standard.  [Citation omitted].  In a
     similar  context  involving  the  propriety  of  agency
     actions  seeking  temporary  relief,  the   former  5th
     Circuit  construed  the  `reasonable  cause to believe'
     standard  as meaning whether an agency's  `theories  of
     law and fact  are  not insubstantial or frivolous.' 920
     F.2d at 747 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
     Congress, in enacting  the  `not  frivolously  brought'
     standard, clearly intended that employers should bear a
     proportionately  greater  burden  of  the  risk  of  an
     erroneous   decision   in   a  temporary  reinstatement
     proceeding.  Any material loss from a mistaken decision
     to  temporarily  reinstate  a  worker  is  slight;  the
     employer continues to retain the  services of the miner
     pending  a  final  decision on the merits.   Also,  the
     erroneous  deprivation   of  the  employer's  right  to
     control  the makeup of his  work  force  under  section
     105(c) is only a temporary one that can be rectified by
     the  Secretary's   decision   not  to  bring  a  formal
     complaint or a decision on the merits in the employer's
     favor.  Id. at 748, n. 11 (emphasis in original).



     Ruling

     The Mine Act accords to miners  protection from discharge or
other  discriminatory  acts,  based  on  their  exercise  of  any
statutory  right  under  the  Act.   30  U.S.C.   �815(c).    The
Commission  has  consistently held a miner seeking to establish a
prima facie case of  discrimination to proving that he engaged in
activity protected by  the  Act  and,  that  he  suffered adverse
action  as  a  result  of  the protected activity.  Secretary  on
behalf of Pasula v. Consolidation  Coal  Company., 2 FMSHRC 2786,
2797-2800  (October  1980),  rev'd  on  other grounds,  sub  nom.
Consolidation Coal Company v. Marshall, 663  F.2d  1211 (3rd Cir.
1981); Secretary on behalf of Robinette v. United Coal Company, 3
FMSHRC  803,  817-18  (April 1981).  In a temporary reinstatement
proceeding, however, an  applicant  is  not  required  to prove a
prima facie case of discrimination, as is the ultimate burden  in
prevailing  on the merits of the complaint, although it is useful
to consider the  elements  of  a  prima facie case in determining
whether the non-frivolous test has been satisfied.

     The  Secretary's  allegations  are   based,   in   part,  on
Investigator   Mesa's  investigation  of  Allen's  discrimination
claims.  In Mesa's  Declaration  of  July  30,  2001, he made the
following  findings upon which he based his conclusion  that  Pea
Ridge had discriminated against Allen:

     1) on or  about  January 24, 2001, Mr. Allen spoke with
     MSHA inspectors at  the  mine conducting an escape ways
     inspection and told them that  particular  parts of the
     mine  were not safe and that he had given up  reporting
     safety  concerns  to  management  as  his concerns were
     never addressed;

     2) on or about January 29, 2001, Allen's first day back
     to  work  after speaking with the MSHA inspectors,  Pea
     Ridge asked  Mr.  Allen to submit to a drug test.  When
     Mr. Allen refused to submit, because he was not able to
     consult  with  an  attorney  on  that  day,  Pea  Ridge
     terminated Mr. Allen; and

     3) this was Pea Ridge's first instance  of  requiring a
     drug test once an employee passed a pre-employment drug
     screening.

     By   supplemental   declaration,  Mesa  provided  additional
information   respecting   his   investigation   by   summarizing
interviews with several Pea  Ridge  employees. Mesa referenced an
interview  with  hourly  "employee A," who  reported  to  Mesa  a
general  rumor  in  the mine  that  superintendent  Larry  Tucker
believed that Allen had  pointed  MSHA  inspectors to some of the
underground violations that had resulted in issuance of citations
and orders during the escapeways inspection.   This  rumor,  Mesa
stated,  was corroborated by "Employee B," who told Mesa that Pea
Ridge employees  were very upset by the citations it had received
during the regular  and  escapeways  inspections.   According  to
Mesa,  both  employees  told  him  that they were unaware of drug
usage  on  the  job  by  Allen.  Mesa stated  that  "Employee  C"
reported having seen Allen talking frequently with MSHA inspector
Rodney  Rice  during  the regular  inspection  which  took  place
between November 2000 and  January  2001, prior to the escapeways
inspection between January and February 2001.  "Employee D," Mesa
asserted, told the investigator that  he had repeatedly asked Pea
Ridge for a written copy of its drug policy,  which  he had never
received,  and that he had never known Allen to use drugs.   Mesa
states that  "Employee E" told him that Pea Ridge would sometimes
request that he  report  to  work  while  he was off and drinking
alcohol, despite the fact that he would make his supervisor aware
that he had been drinking.  Furthermore, Mesa  asserts  that  Pea
Ridge  management  officials Thomas Gallagher (employee relations
director), Larry Tucker  (mine superintendent), and James Sumpter
(mine operations supervisor) refused his requests for interviews.
Hourly employee Jim Reed refused  as  well,  but did speak to the
investigator informally.  According to Mesa, Reed  stated that he
had  never seen nor heard of Allen using marijuana and  that  he,
Reed,  had  not  made  any  allegation  of  Allen  using drugs to
Gallagher.   In  summary,  based on these interviews, Mesa  found
that Allen had a reputation  of  reporting  safety  concerns, and
that there was a rumor that Allen was responsible for some of the
citations and orders issued to Pea Ridge by MSHA .  In  addition,
he  also  found  that, while Pea Ridge had discussed implementing
its drug policy during  several  employee  meetings, there was no
written  policy  and  the employees did not understand  what  the
policy was with any certainty.   Mesa  concluded, therefore, that
Allen's complaint of discriminatory discharge was not frivolously
brought.
     Pea  Ridge's  Opposition,  supported  by   declarations   of
Gallagher,  Sumpter,  Reed  and Lafferty, seeks to establish that
Allen has only shown temporal  proximity  between  his  protected
activity  and his termination, which is insufficient to establish
that  his complaint  was  not  frivolously  brought.   Pea  Ridge
asserts   that  in  regularly  scheduled  monthly  meetings  from
September through December 2000, employees, including Allen, were
made aware  of the company's intention to respond on an "incident
or accident"  basis  to  information  that  caused  a  reasonable
suspicion  of drug usage on the part of an employee, by requiring
submission of  the  suspect  to  a  drug  test.  According to Pea
Ridge,  on  January  25,  2001,  two  non-supervisory  employees,
independently  provided Gallagher with  information  that  caused
him  to  suspect  employees  Allen and Roger Sohn of reporting to
work under the influence of drugs.   Gallagher  attested  to  Jim
Reed  (mechanic  lead  man)  having reported his belief that Sohn
came to work "doped up" and rumors  that  Allen also worked under
the  influence  of  drugs.   Gallagher  also attested  to  Dennis
Lafferty   (production   lead   man)  reporting   drug   problems
underground and alluding to Allen's  work  area  as  smelling  of
marijuana.   It  is  this  information,  Pea  Ridge asserts, that
motivated Gallagher to require Allen and Sohn to  be drug tested,
and  the  sole  reason  for both terminations was their  refusal,
despite notice that the consequence  of  refusal was termination.
Pea Ridge also maintained that employees regularly  and routinely
conversed  with  MSHA  inspectors  and  that,  prior  to  Allen's
termination,  neither  Jeff  Sumpter  nor  any  other  management
official  had  reported  Allen's alleged conversations with  MSHA
inspectors during the January  24, 2001, escapeways inspection or
during any prior inspections.

     Because Pea Ridge has waived  its  right to a hearing on the
Secretary's  application,  while  I have considered  Pea  Ridge's
Opposition, my review must accept as  true the events, as alleged
by  the  Secretary.  Indeed, what is in dispute  is  Pea  Ridge's
motivation  for  terminating  Allen, rather than the facts giving
rise  to the controversy.  Allen  has  not  only  shown  that  he
engaged  in  protected activity during the escapeways inspection,
but has also raised  the  possibility that he had a reputation of
complaining  to  MSHA  inspectors  during  previous  inspections.
Allen has also shown that  he suffered adverse action, and he has
put into question his termination  by  challenging the legitimacy
of  the  drug  test  required  by  Pea  Ridge.    Pea  Ridge,  by
establishing  that  management  was  aware that miners  routinely
conversed with MSHA inspectors, has put  into question the actual
extent  of  Gallagher's knowledge and, while  Gallagher  was  the
deciding  official   in   Allen's   termination,   whether  other
management officials had any input in that decision.   While  Pea
Ridge's  termination  of Roger Sohn is relevant to a construction
of Pea Ridge's motivation in terminating Allen, the circumstances
surrounding Sohn's termination  are  distinguishable from Allen's
because  there is no allegation that Sohn  engaged  in  protected
activity.   Furthermore,  the  evidence  of  exactly who reported
Allen's  alleged  on-the-job  drug  usage  and  whether   it  was
reasonable to require him to take a drug test is in dispute.

     The  temporal  proximity between the protected activity  and
Allen's termination,  in combination with circumstantial evidence
of  management's awareness  of  miners' candid conversations with
MSHA inspectors, rumor that management  believed  Allen  to  have
tipped  off  MSHA  inspectors  during  a  prior  inspection,  and
complaints  about  Allen's  on-the-job drug usage cast in shadow,
are sufficient to meet the non-frivolous  test.   While,  on  the
merits of the complaint,  the Secretary bears the ultimate burden
of  proving  pretext  by  a  preponderance  of  the evidence, the
allegations, as set forth in the Secretary's application, are not
clearly  lacking  in  merit  and, therefore, satisfy  the  lesser
threshold in this proceeding, of  being not frivolously brought.



                         ORDER

     For  the  reasons  set  forth  above,  the  Application  for
Temporary Reinstatement is GRANTED.  It is ORDERED that Pea Ridge
Ore Company, Inc., REINSTATE William  C.  Allen  to  the position
that he held immediately prior to his termination from employment
on January 29, 2001, at the same rate of pay and benefits,  or to
a similar position at the same rate of pay and benefits, with the
same or equivalent duties, effective August 30, 2001.


                              Jacqueline R. Bulluck
                              Administrative Law Judge


Distribution: (Certified Mail)

Lydia   A.   Tzagoloff,  Esq.,  Office  of  the  Solicitor,  U.S.
Department of  Labor,  1099  18th  Street, Suite 2150, Denver, CO
80202

Michael P. Burke, One Metropolitan Square,  221  North  Broadway,
Suite 3600, St. Louis, MO 63102

nt


**FOOTNOTES**

     [1]:Allen's Discrimination Complaint names Thomas Gallagher,
director of personnel, as the management official responsible for
the  adverse  action,  and  alleges that Allen was terminated  on
January 29, 2001, for refusing  to submit to drug testing without
benefit of legal counsel, on the heels of having reported, "among
other things, the poor condition  of  the  middle incline between
2475 level and 2370 level."  Allen's Complaint  also alleges that
mine  operations  supervisor  Jeff  Sumpter had observed  Allen's
conversation with the MSHA inspectors on January 24, 2001.