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[DOCID: f:lk2000102.wais]

 
FREEMAN UNITED COAL COMPANY
November 29, 2000
LAKE 2000-102-R


        FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

               OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                      2 SKYLINE, Suite 1000
                       5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                  FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA  22041


                        November 29, 2000

FREEMAN UNITED COAL COMPANY,  :  CONTEST PROCEEDINGS
               Contestant     :  Docket No. LAKE 2000-102-R
                              :  Citation  No. 7584882; 6/22/2000
                              :
                              :  Docket No. LAKE 2000-103-R
               v.             :  Citation No. 7584883; 6/22/2000
                              :
                              :  Docket No. LAKE 2000-104-R
                              :  Citation   No.   7584884; 6/22/2000
                              :
SECRETARY OF LABOR            :  Docket No. LAKE 2000-105-R
  MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH      :  Citation No. 7584885; 6/22/2000
  ADMINISTRATION, (MSHA),     :
               Respondent     :  Crown II Mine
                              :  Mine ID 11-02236

                        SUMMARY DECISION

     These cases are before me upon the Contests filed by Freeman
United  Coal Company (Freeman United) pursuant to section  105(d)
of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. � 801,
et  seq., the "Act,"  to  challenge  four  citations  issued  by
the Secretary of Labor.  On July 12, 2000, Freeman United filed a
motion for summary decision.  The Secretary responded on July 31,
2000, and filed her own cross motion for summary decision.   Oral
argument  was  held  on  September  15,  2000,  and  the  parties
thereafter filed supplemental written argument.

     Under Commission Rule 67, 29 C.F.R. � 2700.67, a motion  for
summary  decision  shall  be  granted  only if the entire record,
including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, and affidavits, shows: (1) that  there  is no genuine
issue as to any material facts; and (2) that the moving  party is
entitled to summary decision as a matter of law.

     The  citations  at bar all allege violations of the standard
at 30 C.F.R. � 75.1909(a)(1).  That standard provides as follows:

          (a)  Non permissible  diesel-powered  equipment,
     except for the special category  of  equipment  under �
     75.1908(d),  must   be  equipped  with  the  following
     features:

          (1) An engine approved  under  subpart E of part 7
     of  this  title  equipped with an air filter  sized  in
     accordance    with    the     engine     manufacturer's
     recommendations,  and  an air filter service  indicator
     set  in  accordance  with  the   engine  manufacturer's
     recommendations.

     More particularly Citation No. 7584882, charges as follows:

          The Isuzu QD60 diesel engine  used  in  the Number
     04003   Diesel   Gator  was  not  being  maintained  in
     accordance with Subpart  E  of  30  C.F.R.  Part  7.  A
     legible  and permanent approval marking as required  by
     30 C.F.R.  Part  7.90  was  installed  but had not been
     supplied by the engine manufacturer.

     Citations No. 7584883, 7584884 and 7584885,  allege the same
violation but with respect to Isuzu 4BD1PW diesel engine  used in
the  04031  Alpha  personnel  carrier, Isuzu 4BD1PW diesel engine
used in the 04032 Alpha personnel  carrier  and Isuzu QD60 diesel
engine  used  in  the  03107  Taylor Atkinson personnel  carrier,
respectively.

     There  is no dispute in this  case  that  the  cited  diesel
powered equipment  was  non permissible within the meaning of the
cited standard and that therefore  the  cited diesel engines must
be  approved  in  accordance with Subpart E  of  part  7.   Under
Subpart E at Section 7.90 "[e]ach approved diesel engine shall be
identified by a legible  and permanent approval marking inscribed
with the assigned MSHA approval  number  and securely attached to
the diesel engine."

     At  oral  argument  on  September  15, 2000,  the  Secretary
clarified that she is alleging a violation  in  the  citations at
bar  only  on  the  basis of her claim that the approval markings
required  by  Section  7.90  must  be  "supplied  by  the  engine
manufacturer."  (Tr. 5-6).[1]  It is undisputed that the approval
markings utilized by Freeman  United  on the cited equipment were
supplied by Freeman United itself and not  by  the  manufacturer.
Accordingly there is no dispute regarding the material facts.

     In   effect   however  the  Secretary  seeks  to  have  this
Commission rewrite the cited standard to read as follows: "[e]ach
approved diesel engine  shall  be  identified  by  a  legible and
permanent  approval  marking  supplied by the engine manufacturer
and inscribed with the assigned MSHA approval number and securely
attached to the diesel engine."

     The Secretary argues in support  of  this regulatory rewrite
on the premise that the regulation's meaning  is  not  plain  and
that  therefore  deference  should be given to her interpretation
citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S.  144,  148-149  (1991); Udall v.
Tallman,  380  U.S.  1, 16-17 (1965); Energy West Mining  Co.  v.
FMSHRC, 40 F.3d 457, 460-461 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Secretary of Labor
v. Cannelton Industries,  Inc.,  867  F.2d  1432, 1435 (D.C. Cir.
1989);  and Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of  Labor,  744  F.2d
1411, 1414-1415 (10th Cir. 1984). I  find however that the premise
for  Secretary's  deference argument,  i.e., that the meaning of 
the regulation is not plain, does not exist.   When  the  meaning
of a statutory or regulatory provision  is  plain,  effect must be
given  to  its  language. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S.
837, 843-45 (1984).

     The Secretary also  argues that a statute or regulation that
is intended to protect the health and safety of individuals, such
as the regulation at issue herein, must be interpreted in a broad
manner to actually achieve that goal citing Cannelton Industries,
867 F. 2d at 1435.  Donovan  v.  Stafford  Const.  Co., 732 F. 2d
954, 959-960 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and Brennan v. OSHRC,  491  F.  2d
1340,  1344  (2nd  Cir.  1974).  This rule of construction is not
without limit however and  is  not a license to rewrite a clearly
worded  regulation  whose  plain  meaning  cannot  reasonably  be
disputed.

     Therefore, considering the plain  language  of Section 7.90,
there is nothing to preclude the use on the cited  diesel engines
of   approval   markings   supplied  by  Freeman  United  itself.
Accordingly there are no violations  as  alleged in the citations
at  bar.  Under the circumstances, Freeman  United's  Motion  for
Summary Decision must be granted and the Secretary's Cross Motion
for Summary Decision must be denied.

                              ORDER

     Citation  Nos.  7584882,  7584883,  7584884  and 7584885 are
hereby vacated.


                              Gary Melick
                              Administrative Law Judge


Distribution:

Timothy  M. Biddle, Esq., Edward Green, Esq., Crowell  &  Moring,
LLP,  1001  Pennsylvania  Ave.,  N.W.,  Washington,  D.C.   20004
(Certified Mail)

Sheila  Cronan, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of
Labor,  4015   Wilson  Blvd.,  Suite  400,  Arlington,  VA  22203
(Certified Mail)

\mca

**FOOTNOTES**

     [1]: Although  the  Secretary also claims, in her motion and
at oral argument, that the  cited engines were also not otherwise
"approved" - - a claim that is disputed by the operator  - - that
is accordingly not an issue now before me in the instant cases.