<DOC>
[DOCID: f:p9415.wais]

 
WAYNE R. STEEN, employed by AMBROSIA COAL COMPANY
August 20, 1997
PENN 94-15


        FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION


               OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                      2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
                       5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                  FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA  22041


                         August 20, 1997

SECRETARY OF LABOR,             :    CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
  MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH        :
  ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)         :    Docket No. PENN 94-15
               Petitioner       :    A. C. No. 36-04109-03522 A
                                :
          v.                    :
                                :    Ambrosia Tipple Mine
WAYNE R. STEEN Employed by      :
  AMBROSIA COAL COMPANY,        :
               Respondent       :


                         REMAND DECISION

BEFORE:  Judge Barbour

     In  this  civil  penalty  proceeding, the Secretary of Labor
(Secretary),   on   behalf  of  her  Mine   Safety   and   Health
Administration (MSHA),  petitioned  for the assessment of a civil
penalty  against Wayne R. Steen, a foreman  of  Ambrosia  Coal  &
Construction  Company (company).  The petition was filed pursuant
to section 110(c)  of  the  Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977  (Mine  Act  or Act) (30 U.S.C.  � 820(c)).   The  Secretary
alleged  Steen  knowingly   violated   30 C.F.R.  � 77.404(a)  by
allowing  a  highlift  to  be  operated  with  defective  brakes.
(Section 77.404(a)  in  part  requires  mobile  equipment  to  be
maintained in safe operating condition and  equipment  in  unsafe
condition  to be removed immediately from service.)  Steen denied
the   allegations,   and  the  case  was  heard  and  decided  by
Commission Administrative Law Judge William Fauver.

            DECISIONS OF THE JUDGE AND THE COMMISSION

     Judge  Fauver  held   Steen  was  a  corporate  agent  under
section 110(c)  of  the  Act and  Steen  knowingly  authorized  a
violation of the standard.   The  judge found Steen knew for 5 or
6 days the highlift's brakes were defective, yet failed to repair
them or to remove the highlift from service (16 FMSHC 2293, 2300,
2302 (November 1994)).  Although the  Secretary  proposed a civil
penalty  of  $3,500,  the  judge  assessed  Steen $4,000 for  the
violation (16 FMSHRC at 2303-06).

     Judge Fauver based the penalty upon his  findings that Steen
exhibited high negligence in allowing the highlift to be operated
without effective brakes (16 FMSHRC at 2304), the  violation  was
reasonably    likely    to    result    in   a   serious   injury
(16 FMSHRC at 2305),  and after being cited  for  the  violation,
there was instant action  to  comply with the standard (16 FMSHRC
at 2305).   The  judge  also believed  the  amount  assessed  was
"sufficient to deter ...  [Steen], and others similarly situated,
from committing a similar violation  in  the  future"  (16 FMSRHC
at 2305).

     Steen  appealed,  and  although  the  Commission upheld  the
judge's findings regarding Steen's liability under section 110(c)
and Steen's knowing violation of the standard  (Ambrosia  Coal  &
Construction Company (Ambrosia I) 18 FMSHRC 1552, 1563 (September
1996)),   it   concluded  the  judge  improperly  considered  the
deterrent   effect   of   penalty.    (The   Commission   stated,
"[d]eterrence  is  not  a  separate  component  used  to adjust a
penalty amount after the statutory criteria have been considered"
(18 FMSRHC at 1565).)  The Commission also held the judge  failed
to  set  forth  adequate  findings  when  applying  the statutory
penalty criteria to Steen. The Commission remanded the matter for
reassessment of the penalty (18 FMSHRC at 1555-56).

     On remand, the judge noted he had found the violation  to be
a  significant  and  substantial  contribution  to  a mine safety
hazard  due to high negligence.  He also noted Steen's  financial
situation justified amortizing the payment of a civil penalty and
Steen had  no  record  of previous violations.  Putting aside the
deterrent effect of the  penalty with respect to Steen and others
similarly situated, he concluded  the six statutory civil penalty
criteria warranted the assessment of  a  civil  penalty of $3,500
payable  in ten consecutive installments of $350 (18 FMSHRC 1874,
1875-76 (October 1996)).

     Once  again,  Steen  appealed.   He argued the judge did not
make necessary factual findings as to his income or net worth and
that  the  penalty  of  $3,500  was excessive  in  light  of  his
financial situation.  In Steen's  view,  a  total penalty of $575
was appropriate.

     The Commission affirmed Judge Fauver's consideration of four
of  the  six  statutory civil penalty criteria (Ambrosia  Coal  &
Construction Company  (Ambrosia  II)  19 FMSHRC 819, 823-824 (May
1997)).  However, it concluded the judge's  consideration  of the
criteria  of  "ability  to  continue in business" and "size" were
incomplete, and it remanded the matter for further application of
the criteria and reassessment (19 FMSHRC at 824-825).

                     POST REMAND PROCEEDINGS

     On  remand,  the judge ordered  the  parties  to  confer  to
determine if they could  stipulate  to  a  statement  of  Steen's
current  income,  net  worth,  and  financial obligations, and to
include  in  the  stipulation copies of  Steen's  latest  federal
income tax return,  his  W-2 Form and a balance sheet.  The judge
also requested a statement whether or not Steen had the financial
ability  to  pay  a  civil  penalty   of  $3,500  in  10  monthly
installments of $350 and continue to meet other financial
obligations.  If Steen could not, the judge requested the parties
to  stipulate the civil penalty and the  amount  of  the  monthly
installments  he  could  pay  (Order  On Remand (May 9, 1997) (as
modified May 30, 1997)).

     In response, the parties submitted a statement of the income
of Steen and his wife (Stip., Exh. A), a statement of the monthly
expenses of the Steen family (Id., Exh.  B)  (excepting  from the
agreement  the  claim  of  $400  in  monthly  medical  and dental
expenses), a statement of the assets of Steen and his wife  (Id.,
Exh.  C),  a  copy  of the 1996 joint U. S. Individual Income Tax
Return of Steen and his  wife  (Id.,  Exh. D), and  a copy of the
1996 W-2 forms of Steen and his wife (Id., Exhs. E and F).  Steen
submitted  a  separate  statement of dental  expenses  (Statement
Concerning Dental Expenditures (June 19, 1997)).

     Judge Fauver offered the parties an opportunity to request a
hearing on the remanded issues.   If  they  did  not want one, he
stated he would consider the information submitted as evidentiary
and decide the issues on the record (Order (June 25, 1997)).  The
Judge  also stated "Since . . . Steen's tax returns  are  jointly
filed, his income and financial obligations will be considered on
the basis of household and financial obligations" (Id., n.1).

     The  parties  declined  a  hearing and submitted briefs.  On
July 25, 1997, the matter was reassigned to me.

                  ASSESSMENT OF A CIVIL PENALTY
                    THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

     I have a narrow duty on remand  -  to assess a civil penalty
based upon Judge Fauver's prior findings  regarding  four  of the
six civil penalty criteria set forth in section 110(i) of the Act
(30 U.S.C. � 820(i)) and my findings regarding the remaining  two
criteria,  "ability  to  continue  in  business"  and "size."  In
assessing the penalty,  I am instructed by the Commission to make
specific findings and be guided by principles set forth  in Sunny
Ridge  Mining  Co.  (19 FMSHRC  254 (February 1997) (see Ambrosia
II., 19 FMSHRC at 823-824).

     In  Sunny  Ridge,  which was decided  after  Judge  Fauver's
October 1996 decision, the  Commission held that when assessing a
civil  penalty  in  a section 110(c)  case,  a  judge  must  make
findings on the penalty  criteria as they apply to the individual
who has been found liable  and  must  be mindful of facts such as
"the individual's income and family support responsibilities, the
appropriateness  of a penalty in light of  the  individual's  job
responsibilities,  and an individual's ability to pay" (19 FMSHRC
at 272).

     When applying these  principles to the criterion of "ability
to  continue in business," the  Commission  stated  the  relevant
inquiry  is  whether  the  penalty  "will effect the individual's
ability to meet his [or her] financial obligations" (Ambrosia II,
19 FMSRHC at 824).  With respect to the  criterion of "size," the
Commission  directed  an  inquiry into "whether  the  penalty  is
appropriate in light of the  individual's  income  and net worth"
(Id.).

     Because  section 110(c)  places  liability  upon  individual
corporate   directors,   officers,  or  agents  and  because  the
Commission has emphasized  the  effect  of  the  penalty upon the
individual who has been found liable under section 110(c),  Steen
argues  it  was  an error for Judge Fauver to state that he would
consider Steen's financial  information on the basis of household
income and financial obligations.   Steen also maintains it would
be an error for me to consider any part of Mrs. Steen's income in
assessing  the  penalty.   Rather, I should  consider  "only  ...
Steen's income, net worth and  financial  obligations and explain
how they affect the penalty" (Reply Brief Following  Commission's
Second  Remand 3 (emphasis added)).  In other words, Steen  would
have me exclude  from consideration all income earned by his wife
and a percentage of household liabilities equal to the percentage
of her contribution to household income.

     I decline to  do so.  Implicit in Judge Fauver's decision to
consider Steen's income and financial obligations on the basis of
household income and financial obligations is the fact the Steens
do not live economically  discrete  lives.   Like  most  domestic
partners,  they  function  as  an  economic unit.  They commingle
economic resources and jointly assume  economic responsibilities.
They file a joint federal income tax return  (  Stip.,   Exh. D).
They  jointly  hold  real  property  (Stip.,  Exh.  C).  Personal
property, such as automobiles and household property,  is  titled
jointly (Id.).  They have a joint personal checking account  (See
Statement  Concerning  Dental  Expenses).   Moreover,  as  may be
inferred  from the list of expenses, they are equally liable  for
most, if not  all,  of  their debts (Stip., Exh. B).  I must make
findings based on fiscal reality not its artificial segmentation.
Therefore, I will consider  their joint income as Steen's income,
their joint property as his property, and their joint liabilities
as his liabilities.

                 ABILITY TO CONTINUE IN BUSINESS

     The parties stipulated to  monthly family expenses of $2,715
     (Exh. B-1) ($3,115 less medical and dental expenses of $400)
     and Steen submitted documentation to substantiate the dental
     balance  owed or to be incurred  (Stipulation  2;  Statement
     Concerning  Dental  Expenses).  The dental statement details
     expenses paid from August  12  1996  through  June  16, 1997
     ($2,276).   It  also  indicates  two additional appointments
     scheduled for Mrs. Steen in late June 1997, and August 1997,
     for an examination of work already performed.  The statement
     declares as of June 19, 1997 "[a]ll  of  ...  [Mrs. Steen's]
     major  work appears to have been completed."  The  statement
     does not indicate an existing balance is due.

     With no  major dental work anticipated, and with no existing
     balance, it appears that as of June 19, Steen and Mrs. Steen
     have paid  most of her past due dental bills, and her future
     dental expenses  will  be  for  forthcoming appointments and
     routine  dental work.  Recognizing  unexpected  medical  and
     dental expenses  can arise and estimating future expenses is
     to  some  extent an  exercise  in  imprecision,  I  conclude
     allocating  $250  a  month to medical and dental expenses is
     reasonable.

     Therefore, based upon  the parties' stipulations and Steen's
     statement  concerning dental  expenses,  I  find  Steen  has
     monthly family  expenses  of  $2,965  ($3,115 less $400 plus
     $250).

     To meet these expenses, Steen has  available  to him monthly
     family  income  of  $3,156 (Stip., Exh. A).  This  leaves  a
     balance of $191 per month.   Presently  Steen is meeting his
     financial obligations with money to spare.

                              SIZE

     The  parties stipulated that Steen's annual  net  income  is
     $20,300  and  his  combined  annual  net  income  is $37,873
     (Stip.,  Exh.  A).   Steen's  net  income is well above  the
     "poverty  level"  for  a family of three  ($12,517  in  1996
     according    to    the   U.S.   Department    of    Commerce
     (http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/
     threshld/thresh96.html)).   Moreover,  Steen has significant
     equity  in  his  home ($43,610) and he has  automobiles  and
     other personal property  worth  $5,500  (Stip., Exh. C).  In
     light of his income and net worth,  I conclude Steen is well
     able  to pay a penalty of at least moderate  size,  provided
     the penalty is amortized.

                           THE PENALTY

     Judge Fauver  concluded that Steen exhibited high negligence
     in authorizing  the violation of section 77.404(a).  He also
     found the violation  was  serious,  and that the criteria of
     good  faith  abatement  did not apply (18 FMSHRC  at  1875).
     These findings were affirmed by the Commission (Ambrosia II,
     19 FMSHRC at 823-824).  Judge  Fauver  also  found,  and the
     Commission  affirmed,  Steen's  employer,  Ambrosia,  had an
     average  history  of  previous violations and he noted there
     was no indication Steen  previously  violated section 110(c)
     of  the Act (18 FMSHRC at 1875; Ambrosia  II,  19 FMSRHC  at
     823-824).

     Weighing  these  factors,  along with Steen's income, family
     support responsibilities, and  net  worth, I conclude that a
     total penalty of $2,000 is warranted  and  that it should be
     payed   in   installments  for  12 consecutive  months.    I
     recognize   the   penalty   and   payments   will   not   be
     inconsequential for Steen, given his obligations and income,
     but then neither  was his knowing and egregious violation of
     section 77.404(a).

     It bears repeating  the  highlift  was operating with brakes
     that  could not hold on a 30 to 40 degree  ramp,  through  a
     tipple  yard  with  unobstructed access to a nearby highway,
     and with an operator  who did not have a seatbelt (16 FMSHRC
     at 2299).  Steen had full knowledge of all these conditions,
     yet he allowed the highlift  of  operate  for at least 5 and
     possibly  6 working  days  (16 FMSHRC at 2302),  endangering
     himself (Steen actually operated  the  highlift while it had
     defective  brakes  (Id.)),  the  highlift  operator,   other
     miners, and the public.

     It  also  bears  repeating,  as  Judge  Fauver  pointed  out
     originally,  that  section 110(c)  is included in the Act to
     deter this kind of violation.

                           TWO LESSONS

     Two cautionary lessons attend this case.   First,  a foreman
     of a corporate operator who knows of existing violations  of
     the  Mine Act or its standards must promptly remedy them.  A
     foreman who fails to act does so at his or her fiscal peril.

     Second,  through  Sunny  Ridge,  the  Secretary is on notice
     concerning  the  type  of information the  Commission  deems
     necessary to establish the "ability to continue in business"
     and "size penalty" criteria.   The burden of proof is on the
     Secretary.    Failure   to   offer  the   evidence   through
     stipulation or documentation prior  to  the  closing  of the
     evidentiary  record  will result in a judge being unable  to
     consider the criteria  and,  most  likely,  in  a much lower
     civil   penalty.    This  will  necessitate  more  intensive
     prehearing preparations  by  the  Secretary,  since,  in all
     probability,  judges will not look favorably on requests  to
     submit the information post hearing.

                              ORDER

     Steen shall pay a civil penalty of $2,000.  Payment shall be
     made  in 11 consecutive installments of $166.66 each and the
     12th  installment   of  $166.74.   Payments  will  begin  on
     November 1, 1997, and  continue  on  the  first  day of each
     succeeding month until the full amount has been paid.   Upon
     full payment of the penalty, this proceeding is DISMISSED.



                                David F. Barbour
                                Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

T.  J.  O'Malley, Esq., Office of
the Solicitor,  U.  S. Department
of Labor, 3535 Market Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19104 (Certified
Mail)

Frank    G.    Verterano,   Esq.,
Verterano    &   Manolis,    2622
Wilmington Road,  New  Castle, PA
16105-1530 (Certified Mail)

William  P.  Getty, Esq.,  Meyer,
Unkovic   &Scott,   1300   Oliver
Building,  Pittsburgh,  PA  15222
(Certified Mail)