<DOC>
[DOCID: f:va9979.wais]

 
ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY
October 6, 1999
VA 99-79-C


        FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

               OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                      2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
                       5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                  FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA  22041


                         October 6, 1999

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,   :  CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
  LOCAL UNION 2232, DISTRICT 20,  :
  on behalf of MINERS,            :  Docket No. VA 99-79-C
                   Applicants,    :
          v.                      :  VP No. 8 Mine
                                  :  Mine ID 44-03795
ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY,        :
                   Respondent     :

                             DECISION

Appearances: Max Kennedy, International Representative, United
             Mine Workers of America, Castlewood, Virginia, for
             the Applicants; 
             Elizabeth S. Chamberlin, Esq., Consol, Inc.,
             Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.

Before:  Judge Weisberger

                      Statement of the Case

     This  case  is  before  me  based   upon   a  Complaint  for
Compensation  filed  by  the  United  Mine  Workers  of   America
("UMWA"), pursuant to section 111 of the Federal Mine Safety  and
Health  Act  of 1977 ("the Act") seeking compensation due certain
miners employed  by Island Creek Coal Company ("Island Creek") on
the ground that they  were withdrawn from Island Creek's VP8 Mine
pursuant  to  a  section  107(a)   Withdrawal   Order  issued  on
December 2, 1998.  The case was heard in Kingsport, Tennessee, on
June 24,  1999.   On September 22, 1999, the Respondent  filed  a
Post Hearing Brief.   On September 24, 1999, the Applicants filed
a Post Hearing Brief.

I.  Findings of Fact

     On  December  2, 1998,  David  Fowler,  an  MSHA  inspector,
accompanied by Billy  Eugene  Shelton, a miner employed by Island
Creek who was a union walk-around,  and  Michael  Canada,  Island
Creek's mine safety inspector, inspected the three south entries,
in  Island  Creek's  VP8 Mine, an underground coal mine.  Fowler,
along with Canada and  Shelton,  proceeded to walk south down the
No. 1 entry of the three north mains area.  Fowler and Canada had
digital methane detectors with them.  Before they reached the No.
1 west development area, Fowler's  methane  detector  indicated a
reading   of   2.1   percent,  and  Canada's  detector  indicated
1.8 percent.  Fowler told  Canada  that he would issue a citation
if  it would subsequently be determined  that  his  detector  was
accurate.[1]

     Since   Fowler's   digital  methane  detector  had  revealed
elevated methane, the inspecting  party proceeded to walk further
south down the entry to investigate  the  source  of the methane,
and the areas affected in order to eliminate this hazard.  In the
area  of  the  No.  1  entry east of the No. 19 seal, Fowler  and
Canada  took  additional  methane  readings  with  their  digital
detectors.   Fowler's  detector   indicated   a  reading  of  4.5
percent.[2]  Fowler told Shelton to bring him his  Riken  methane
detector which is more accurate than the digital detectors Fowler
and Canada had been using.  Canada than told Fowler that he would
have  to  pull  his  people  based  on Virginia law, if the Riken
detector   would  indicate  methane  of  4.5   percent.    Fowler
determined to continue his investigation.

     At approximately 11:30 a.m., Shelton returned with the Riken
detector which  revealed  a methane reading of 4.5 percent in the
No. 2 development area.  Canada  left  Fowler and Shelton to call
the mine dispatcher.  Canada told the latter  to get everyone out
of the mine due to elevated methane.

     Fowler and Shelton then continued south down the No. 1 entry
to  investigate  further.   Elevated  methane  readings   up   to
10 percent  were  observed in the Nos. 4 and 5 development areas.
In addition, plaster  sealing  the Nos. 4 and 5 development areas
from the gob area was no longer  intact,  evidencing the presence
of methane.

     At approximately 12:00 n., Canada rejoined Fowler in the No.
4 development  area where methane in the range  of 8 to 9 percent
was  detected.   Fowler  told Canada that a section 107(a)  order
would be issued because ".  . . [h]e knew what area was involved,
how much methane was involved,  and was sure of the origination"(
Tr. 69).   According  to  Fowler,  he  asked  Canada  or  another
management  official  "to  remove  the  men   from   underground"
(Tr. 73).  According to Canada, Fowler never told him to withdraw
any miners, nor did he discuss the scope of the 107(a)  order, or
whether  it required the withdrawal of anyone from the mine.   In
this connection,  on  cross-examination, Fowler agreed that it is
possible that he told Canada that he was not considering a 107(a)
order because the men had already been withdrawn.


**FOOTNOTES**

     [1]:  At  12:12  p.m.,  Fowler  issued  a  section  104(a)
citation, No. 7297958, alleging a violation of 30 C.F.R., 
� 75.323(e), which was subsequently vacated.

     [2]:  Canada's  detector  indicated  a  methane level a few
tenths less than indicated on Fowler's detector. It was stip-
ulated that the 107(a) order was  issued at 12:12 p.m. Fowler
explained that it was then that he determined  that the miners
should  be withdrawn.  The order, that Fowler reduced to writing
when he exited the mine, contains Fowler's description of the
conditions warranting the issuance  of the order. In paragraph
15  of the order, under the hearing Area or Equipment, Fowler
set forth  as  follows:  "5 Dev. and 4 Dev."  There are no other
 words used in the order to  describe  the  area of the mine
subject  to  the  order i.e., the area from which miners were
ordered to be withdrawn.[3]

     Sometime after 1:00 p.m., after the order was issued, Fowler
met some rank and file miners at the B shaft, and told them to go
outside.  Fowler informed Terry Suder, the mine's superintendent,
that he needed to make sure to get everyone  out of the mine.  It
was  stipulated  that  the  first  miners  exited  the   mine  at
approximately 1:30 p.m.

II.  Section 111 of the Act

     The  Applicants'  right  to  compensation is predicated upon
section 111 of the Act, which, as pertinent, provides as follows:

          If a coal or other mine or  area  of  such mine is
     closed by an order issued under . . . section  107, all
     miners  working  during  the shift when such order  was
     issued who are idled by such  order  shall be entitled,
     regardless of the results of any review  of such order,
     to  full compensation by the operator at their  regular
     rates of pay for the period they are idled, but for not
     more than the balance of such shift.

III.  Discussion

     The present  controlling  authority for the issues at bar is
Local  Union  1261,  District  22,  UMWA v.   Consolidation  Coal
Company, 11 FMSHRC 1609 (1989), Aff'd sub nom.  Local  Union 1261
v. FMSHRC, 917 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  As in the case  at bar,
the issue therein was whether miners are entitled to compensation
under the first and second sentences of section 111 when the mine
operator has voluntarily closed the mine for safety reasons prior
to  the  issuance of an order described in section 111, but where
such an order is subsequently issued.


**FOOTNOTES**

     [3]: In paragraph 10 of the order, Gravity, subparagraph D,
The Number  of  Persons  Affected,  Fowler  set  forth as follows
"060."  Fowler explained in his testimony that he  thought at the
time  that  there were 60 miners underground.  On its  face,  the
number  of  persons  affected  relates  to  the  gravity  of  the
violative conditions, rather than being a specific designation of
the area of the mine being subject to an order of withdrawal.
     The Commission in that case, at 11 FMSHRC 1613-1614, held as
follows:

          The  meaning of the first two sentences of section
     111 is clear.  If a specified withdrawal order has been
     issued, "all  miners working during the shift when such
     order was issued  who  are  idled  by  such  order" are
     entitled  to  compensation  for the remainder of  their
     shift.   (Emphasis  added.)   If   the   order  is  not
     terminated prior to "the next working shift, all miners
     on that shift who are idled by such order" are entitled
     to  compensation  for  up  to  four  hours.   (Emphasis
     added.)  The language is in nowise qualified.  Thus, to
     be entitled to shift compensation, a miner must  either
     be  working  during  the shift when the specified order
     was issued and have been  idled by the order or, if the
     order  is  not terminated prior  to  the  next  working
     shift, must be on the next working shift.

          Here, the  preconditions  for entitlement to shift
     compensation were not met.  At the  time  the order was
     issued, no miners were working nor had they  been since
     the   previous   evening   at  which  time  Consol  had
     voluntarily withdrawn all miners  in order to guarantee
     their  safety.   Therefore,  none  of  those  for  whom
     compensation is claimed were "working during  the shift
     when  .  .  . [the] order was issued."  Further, Consol
     advised miners  on  the other two shifts that "the mine
     is  idled until further  notice."  [Citation  omitted.]
     Therefore,  none  of  those  for  whom  compensation is
     claimed  were  on "the next working shift."   (Emphasis
     added.) [Footnote omitted.]  We therefore hold that the
     claimants,  not  having   met   these   plainly  stated
     prerequisites, were not eligible to be compensated.

     The court of Appeals, on review, held that  the Commission's
interpretation limiting the phrase "working during the shift," to
miners  actually  working  when  the  order  is  issued,   was  a
reasonable interpretation.  Local Union 1261, 917 F.2d at 47.

     The  Commission  majority  explained  the  rationale for its
decision as follows:

          Apart from the plain wording of the statute, there
     are  also  practical considerations.  A statute  should
     not be construed  in  a  way  that is foreign to common
     sense or its legislative purpose.  Sutherland Statutory
     Construction  �� 45.09,  45.12  (4th   ed.  1985).   As
     discussed,  the  Mine Act involves a balancing  of  the
     interest of mine operators,  and  miners,  with  safety
     being  the  preeminent  concern.  Section 2 of the Mine
     Act specifies at the outset  that  "the  first priority
     and concern of all in the coal or other mining industry
     must  be  the  health  and safety of its most  precious
     resource -- the miner," and section 2(e) adds that "the
     operators of such mines  with  the  assistance  of  the
     miners  have  the primary responsibility to prevent the
     existence of [unsafe  and  unhealthful]  conditions and
     practices  in  such  mines."   The  Mine  Act  was  not
     intended to remove from an
     operator  the right to withdraw miners from a mine  for
     safety reasons.   While MSHA has the authority to order
     such  withdrawal,  it   does   not   have   that  power
     exclusively.

                        *   *   *   *   *

          The  purpose  and scope of shift compensation  can
     also  be  determined  by   another   important  concern
     expressed  by Congress in adopting section 111  in  its
     specific terms:  insulating the mine inspector from any
     repercussions that  might  arise  from  his withdrawing
     miners   and   temporarily  depriving  them  of   their
     livelihood.  A key  passage  from  the  Report  of  the
     Senate  Committee  setting  forth the rationale for the
     miners' compensation provision  concludes  by  stating,
     "[t]his   provision   will  also  remove  any  possible
     inhibition of the inspector  in the issuance of closure
     orders."  Leg. Hist. At 635.   This  convinces  us that
     Congress  intended  shift  compensation rights to arise
     only when the physical removal of miners is effectuated
     by  the  inspector himself so  that  the  inspector  in
     carrying out his enforcement duties is not inhibited or
     distracted    by    workplace   considerations   wholly
     extraneous to the protection of miners.

     11 FMSHRC at 1614-15

     In the case at bar, the  sequence of events is basically not
at issue.  I find that at approximately  11:30 a.m.,  Canada told
the  dispatcher  to  get everyone out of the mine due to elevated
methane.  Thus, when Fowler  issued  the section 107(a) order, an
order had already been given by Consol  withdrawing  the  miners.
Under  the  holding  and  rationale  of  Local  Union, supra, the
removal  of  the  miners  previously  ordered to be withdrawn  by
Canada, was not effectuated by Fowler's order.  These miners were
no longer "working" when Fowler issued  the 107(a) order, and are
not entitled to compensation under section 111, supra.

     Applicants   argue,  however  that  the  instant   case   is
distinguishable from  Local  Union,  supra,  in that here, Consol
attempted to avoid section 111 liability by withdrawing miners in
anticipation  of  withdrawal action by MSHA.  The  Commission  in
Local Union, supra,  appeared  to  suggest  that  this might be a
possible  distinguishing  factor.  See Local Union 1261,  fn6  at
pp. 1614-1615.  However, this  suggestion  by  the  Commission is
clearly dictum as it was not necessary for a disposition  of  the
issues  presented therein.  Nor is there any authority that would
compel a  ruling  that  where  an  operator  withdraws  miners in
anticipation  of  the  issuance  of a 107(a) order, the withdrawn
miners  are  entitled  to  section 111   compensation  where  the
107(a) order is subsequently issued.

     Moreover,  such a broad ruling, if applied  to  a  situation
where an operator  might  have anticipated the possibility of the
issuance of a 107(a) order, but also withdrew miners based on
safety concerns, would appear to thwart the Commission's concerns
regarding the purpose of section 111,  supra.   As  stated by the
Commission in Local Union, supra, at 1614,

          .  .  .  it  would  be  a departure from the clear
     intent and purpose of the Act  to penalize the operator
     for voluntarily idling miners for their own protection.
     To  impose  such liability could conceivably  encourage
     less conscientious  operators  in similar circumstances
     to continue production, at risk  to  the  miners, until
     the  MSHA  inspectors arrived to issue a control  order
     idling the miners.  We do not believe that the Mine Act
     was intended to stifle such safety conscious actions by
     operators, as Consol took here.

     Further,  Applicants  have  not  established  that  Consol's
decision  to remove  miners  was  made  in  anticipation  of  the
issuance of  a 107(a) order.  When the digital detectors revealed
methane in excess  of  4 percent,  Canada expressed his intent to
remove miners to comply with Virginia  Law,  should  readings  in
excess  of  4.5 percent  be confirmed with the Riken detector. In
contrast,  the  only communication  Fowler  had  made  to  Consol
regarding action  that  he was considering was his statement that
he was contemplating issuing  a section 104(a) citation[4] should
the  reading  that  he  had obtained  with  his  digital  methane
detector be subsequently  verified  with  the Riken detector.  At
11:30 a.m.,   when  the  Riken  testing  indicated   methane   at
4.5 percent, Canada  told  Fowler  that  he was going to withdraw
miners, and then he (Canada) ordered their withdrawal, Fowler had
not indicated that he was even contemplating issuing a withdrawal
order, or that he had found the conditions to constitute any type
of imminent danger.  Fowler's decision to  issue  the  withdrawal
order was first made by him shortly after 12:00 p.m., only  after
he   had   ascertained   the   source   and   extent  of  methane
accumulations.

     For  all the above reasons, I conclude that  the  Applicants
are not entitled to compensation under section 111 of the Act.

                              ORDER

     It is ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED.


                                Avram Weisberger
                                Administrative Law Judge


Distribution:

Max Kennedy, International Representative, United Mine Workers of
America, District 20,  Subdistrict  28, P. O. Box 28, Castlewood,
VA 24224 (Certified Mail)

Elizabeth S. Chamberlin, Esq., CONSOL Inc., 1800 Washington Road,
Pittsburgh, PA 15241 (Certified Mail)

/dcp


**FOOTNOTES**

     [4]:  On direct examination, Fowler  indicated that he had
told Canada or some other management official  that  he  would be
issuing  a section 107(a) order as he was sure of the origination
of  the  methane,   and   asked  them  to  remove  the  men  form
underground.   However, on cross-examination,  it  was  clarified
that after he had  concluded  that  the  3,  4, and 5 development
areas were involved, i.e., after 12:00 n., he told Canada that he
would be issuing a section 107(a) order.