<DOC>
[DOCID: f:w-95-258.wais]
ENERGY WEST MINING COMPANY
September 5, 1996
WEST 95-258
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
1244 SPEER BOULEVARD #280
DENVER, CO 80204-3582
303-844-3993/FAX 303-844-5268
September 5, 1996
SECRETARY OF LABOR, : CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH :
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), : Docket No. WEST 95-258
Petitioner : A.C. No. 42-01944-03649
:
v. :
: Cottonwood Mine
ENERGY WEST MINING COMPANY, :
Respondent :
DECISION
Appearances: Robert Cohen, Esq., Office of he Solicitor,
U.S. Department of Labor, Arlington, Virginia,
for Petitioner;
Timothy M. Biddle, Esq., Lisa A. Price, Esq.,
Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Before: Judge Cetti
This case is before me upon a petition for assessment of
civil penalties under sections 105(d) and 110 of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. � 801 et seq. the "Mine
Act." The Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration, (MSHA), charges Energy West Mining Company
(Energy West) with the violation of the mandatory safety standard
30 C.F.R. � 75.202(a). Energy West is the operator of the Cottonwood
Mine, an underground coal mine, located in Emery County in Southwestern Utah.
MSHA issued the single citation in question after
its investigation of a "coal outburst" or "bounce" [1]
which occurred in the 4th left working section of the
Cottonwood Mine on May 16, 1994, at approximately 12:38
p.m. in a large uncompleted proposed pillar. The
pillar was not fully formed by completion or mining of
surrounding entries and crosscuts. (Tr. 421).
There was a mining crew working in the section, but no
miners suffered any injuries as a result of the bounce.
Nevertheless, because ventilation on the section was disrupted
and production stopped more than an hour, MSHA was notified of
the incident. MSHA Inspector Baker was at the mine at the time
the bounce occurred on May 16, 1994, and immediately went to
the 4th left section to investigate. Baker did not issue a
citation at that time but did issue the citation in question a
full two weeks later on June 1, 1994. The citation alleges a
violation of 30 C.F.R. � 75.202(a) which provides as follows:
30 C.F.R. � 75.202 Protection from falls of
roof, face and ribs:
(a) The roof, face and ribs of areas where
persons work or travel shall be supported or
otherwise controlled to protect persons from
hazards related to falls of the roof, face or
ribs and coal or rock bursts.
II
ISSUES
The Petitioner in his post-hearing brief
states the issues for decision as follows:
1. Did the Secretary establish that a
reasonably prudent person familiar with the
coal mining conditions at the Cottonwood Mine
would have provided additional measures to
prevent bounces in 4th left section? See the
Commission's decision in Canon Coal Company,
9 FMSHRC 667 (1987).
2. Did the evidence establish that Energy
West violated 30 CFR 75.202(a) at the
Cottonwood Mine because the operator failed
to take adequate roof and rib support de-
stressing measures in the 4th left section,
an area prone to "bounces" and "coal
outbursts"?
3. Can the Secretary establish a
violation of 30 CFR 75.202(a), even if there
is no evidence that Energy West violated its
approved roof control plan?
4. If the evidence established that
Energy West violated 30 CFR 75.202(a), what
is the appropriate amount of civil penalty
that should (be) assessed by the presiding
Administrative Law Judge?
III
STIPULATIONS
1. Energy West and its Cottonwood Mine are subject to the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over this proceeding.
3. The citation at issue was issued by an authorized
representative of the Secretary and was properly served on
an agent of Energy West.
4. The citation was abated in good faith.
5. Energy West, Cottonwood Mine, is a large underground
coal mine.
6. Energy West's ability to continue in business will not
be affected by an assessment of a reasonable civil penalty
if the Secretary proves a violation in this case.
IV
BACKGROUND
Energy West's Cottonwood Mine is an underground coal mine
located under East Mountain in southwestern Utah. At the
time of the May 16th bounce which resulted in the citation,
the Cotton-wood Mine employed 225 hourly workers,
represented by the United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA"),
and 60 management personnel. Cottonwood produced 3.5
million tons of clean coal in 1994.
The Cottonwood Mine is a "multi-seam" mine. Energy West's
Deer Creek Mine lies 85-110 feet above the Cottonwood Mine
workings. The amount of "overburden," or cover, over the
Cottonwood mine ranges up to 2,100 feet. The cover in the
area where the bounce occurred, the 4th left section, was
approximately 1,600 feet.
Energy West mines the coal from Cottonwood Mine with long-
wall equipment. To prepare for set-up of the longwall unit,
continuous mining machines develop gate entries, or roads,
off a main line, outlining a solid block of coal to be mined
by the longwall mining equipment. In the Cottonwood Mine,
these solid blocks of coal, or longwall panels, range from
600-750 feet in width and can vary from 1,500 to 5,000 feet
in length. After the longwall equipment is set up at the
end of the gateroads, a shear cuts coal along the face of
the panel. It takes approximately four months for longwall
equipment to mine the entire block of coal between the
gateroads, producing about 800,000 tons of coal.
Cottonwood began development of the main entries ("mains")
in Second North in 1990. As the mains were developed,
continuous mining machines also developed "neck-offs" to
begin gateroads for future longwall panels on both the east
and west, or right and left, sides off Second North.
These neck-offs were started at the same time as the main
entries to create space for future construction when
Cottonwood was ready to begin longwall mining in the panels
intersecting Second North. The neck-off areas off the mains
of Second North were rooms separated by pillars of coal for
support. They were the beginning of development of
gateroads for future longwall panels and were necessary to
allow access to complete necessary ventilation work and belt
drive installation for future mining. (See Ex. R-2).
The neck-off areas had three entries with 100-foot pillars
separating the entries. Because longwall gateroads must
only have two entries adjacent to the coal to be cut with
longwall equipment, the three neck-off entries were later
reduced to two gateroad entries. Once narrowed to two
entries, two large pillars, 50' by 100', separated the
gateroad entries. There were no significant differences in
the layout of each neck-off area on the east and west sides
of Second North. Solid coal lay beyond the place where
three entry mining stopped in each neck.
The Second North main entries in Cottonwood Mine were
directly under old mains in the Deer Creek workings above.
At the time Second North was developed in Cottonwood, the
areas above in Deer Creek had already been mined and were
not active. Since the Second North mains had to remain open
during longwall mining for ventilation, for a conveyor belt,
and for transporta-tion of material and miners, a protective
400-foot "barrier" of solid coal paralleled the mains on
both sides of Second North. A similar barrier lay directly
above in the Deer Creek works.
Development of the panel neck-offs in Cottonwood's Second
North required mining under the Deer Creek barrier. Carl
Pollastro, the Mine Manager and General Superintendent
testified: "Any time that mining penetrates these barriers,
there is stress that's induced by virtue of this barrier and
the mining pressures that are transferred from the works
above." This stress or pressure is a naturally occurring
consequence of multi-seam mining. Crossing under the Deer
Creek barrier while developing panel neck-offs as occurred
in Second North was a common practice for Cottonwood; for
example, the development of the neck-offs in First North
involved "at least 11 penetrations of the barrier," with the
same type of pillar layout and entry configuration as in
Second North. There were about 25 development sections in
Cottonwood with similar configurations that involved multiseam
mining. Once gateroad development progressed past the
barrier, the pressures caused by barrier penetration
dramatically de-
creased.
After the Second North mains and the longwall panel neck-
offs were developed. Cottonwood began the second stage of
development; extending two-entry gateroads from the neck-
offs for the full length of each successive panel. This
work began in each panel with the neckdown from three
entries to two entries.
The 8th left and 9th left panels were the first in Second
North to be fully developed and retreated with the longwall
unit, with 10th right, 11th right and 12th right following
thereafter. Mining then moved to the remaining panels on
the right or east side of Second North, with gateroad
development and longwall retreat mining starting with 8th
right and proceeding south to each panel below until all the
longwall panels on the east side in Second North (8th to
1st) were mined.
By the end of January 1994, mining was ready to resume on
the west side of Second North. The 6th left gateroads were
the first scheduled to be developed for longwall mining. As
mining began in the neck-off area in 6th left, roof falls
and rib bounces occurred in the entries that had already
been developed. Because of safety concerns and logistical
convenience. Two new entries were developed to the south of
the previously developed entries in the 6th left original
neck-off so the unstable area would not have to be traveled.
Thus, the 6th left entry and pillar configuration in the
neck-off area was slightly different than the remaining
panels on the west side of Second North.
V
As the neck-down to two entries continued in 6th left, it
became apparent that Deer Creek barrier pressure was causing
roof and rib stability problems in that area. As a result,
Kevin Tuttle, then Chief Safety Engineer at the Cottonwood
Mine and Carl Pollastro, then Manager and General
Superintendent at the Cottonwood Mine, met with James E.
Kirk, then Acting Subdistrict Manager of the MSHA
Subdistrict Office in Price, Utah, to discuss steps that
could be taken to reduce or eliminate outbursts of ribs and
roof falls. Mr. Kirk and Blake Hanna, an MSHA roof control
expert, visited Cottonwood to observe the roof conditions
caused by the overlying Deer Creek barrier. The discussions
between Cottonwood and MSHA at this time focused on the
safest way to continue gateroad development in 6th left,
while future panels in Second North were mentioned, no
proposals for these panels were made at this time.
VI
In light of the roof control difficulties in 6th left and
knowing the Deer Creek barrier also would have to be crossed
during gateroad development in the 5th, 4th, 3rd, and 2nd
left panels, Cottonwood management met with the hourly
workers in crew meetings to discuss additional safeguards to
minimize the hazards. A particular concern involved the pillars
in neck-off sections previously developed in 1991 along Second
North to allow for subsequent longwall mining. As development
proceeded in future Second North panels under the Deer Creek
barrier, it was believed important to take measures to
"soften" the 1991 pillars so they would not build up
pressures caused by penetration under the Deer Creek
barrier. Cottonwood's management decided that the 1991
pillars in the remaining Second North neck-offs should be
notched to make them smaller and more likely to yield as
they absorbed overburden pressure.
"Notching" a pillar means cutting enough coal out of the
center of a pillar to allow the release of the stress that
naturally and dynamically builds in a pillar as active
mining around it forces it to absorb overburden pressures.
A notched pillar converges upon itself in a controlled
manner so that the likelihood of a sudden outburst of coal
or "bounce" is reduced. Pillar notching can be hazardous
depending on the circumstances, but those hazards can be
minimized by limiting the number of miners near the pillar
while the notch is being cut.
Reduction of pillar size through notching created potential
for small outbursts, but such activity was a positive sign
since it indicated that the pillar was yielding effectively
and in a controlled manner.
VII
THE PILLAR NOTCH PLAN
Having decided that notching the remaining 1991 pillars in
Second North was necessary to protect the miners,
Cottonwood's management formulated a pillar notch plan to
supplement its approved roof control plan and asked the
Union to review it. Cottonwood incorporated several Union
suggestions into its notch plan and the Union approved it.
Cottonwood then submitted the notch plan to MSHA on February
2, 1994, as an amendment to its roof control plan. The plan
was accompanied by a cover letter summarizing it. (Ex. G-
3).
The notch plan provided that the pillars created in 1991
during the development of Second North mains would be
notched to relieve stress before further development of
gateroads for longwall panels. The plan was detailed; it
contained four pages of text and diagrams specifically
outlining the procedures to be followed for notching the
1991 pillars in the 5th, 4th, 3rd, and 2nd Left section in
Second North. Additionally, the plan includ-
ed a diagram of the west side of Second North and detailed
diagrams for the development of the gateroads in the 5th, 4th,
3d and 2d left sections. Those diagrams showed that notches
also were to be cut in the "new" and smaller pillars to be
created as the three gateroads in the neck-offs angled down
to two gateroads. The new pillars showing notches on the plan
diagrams were to be the last pillars under the Deer Creek barrier
and Cotton-wood believed it prudent to notch these new pillars
after they were formed, using the same notching process as
used for the 1991 pillars and for the same reason, to
relieve overburden pressure.
The notches in the 1991 pillars in the 5th through 2nd left
sections were to be cut 40' deep into the center of the
pillar, because they were to be smaller, the newly developed
pillars were to have 30' notches into their centers (Ex. G-
3, Tr. 266-67). Neither the notch plan nor the cover letter
summarizing it speci-fied any particular time for notching
during the process of mining, neither in terms of which of
the 1991 pillars would be notched first, nor when new
pillars would be notched during the gateroad development
process. (Ropchan, Tr. 182; Pollastro, 265-266, 324).
There was conflicting use of the word "sequence" at the
hearing. "Sequence" can refer to the order in which
particular pillars were to be notched. (Tr. 421).
"Sequence" of notching could also refer to whether a notch
in a new pillar was to be cut before or after the pillar was
fully formed by completion of mining of surrounding entries
and crosscuts. Under either defi-nition, there was no
sequence specified in the notch plan.
VIII
THE CONFERENCE CALL
MSHA and Cottonwood agreed to a conference call on Febru-
ary 4, 1994, to discuss the notch plan. Kevin Tuttle,
Cotton-wood's Chief Safety Engineer, went to the MSHA
Subdistrict Office in Price, Utah, where he joined Tony
Gabossi, MSHA's Subdistrict Manager. Tuttle and Gabossi
called the MSHA District Office in Denver, where several
MSHA representatives had gathered to dis-cuss the plan. The
MSHA officials in Denver who participated in the conference
call were Bill Holgate, MSHA's District Manager, and Jerry
Taylor, an MSHA engineer, as well as several officials from
MSHA's Technical Support, Safety and Health Technology
Center, including Sid Hansen, engineer, and David Ropchan,
engineer.
During the conference call, MSHA officials wanted several
additions to the notch plan before approving it.
Specifically, MSHA required that 20' of roof exposed in each
notch be permanently bolted. Further, MSHA required that
additional roof support, in the form of timbers or square
sets, be installed in the entry where a notch would be
started. Nothing was added to the plan about when the
notches would be cut in either the 1991 pillars or in the
new pillars to be created during gateroad development. Mr.
Tuttle immediately made the MSHA required changes to the
notch plan and faxed them to the MSHA District Office. The
notch plan was approved by District Manager Holgate by
letter on February 4, 1994, the day the conference call
occurred. (See Ex. G-3).
IX
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NOTCH PLAN IN 5TH LEFT SECTION
Shortly after the notch plan was approved by MSHA on Febru-
ary 4, 1994, Cottonwood implemented the plan in 5th left of
Second North. (Ex. R-3; Tr. 268). The 1991 pillars were
notched according to the notch plan. (Ex. G-3 at 6, R-3).
The #1, #2 and #3 gateroad entries were developed under the
general mine plan. (Tr. 321). Once the entries proceeded
far enough for the #5 crosscut, the crosscut was mined from
the #1 entry to break through at the #2 entry. (Tr. 270).
After a new pillar came into existence between crosscuts #4
and #5, it was notched as shown in the 5th left diagram
attached to the plan. Since there were no reportable
bounces or significant roof falls during the notching in 5th
left, Cottonwood considered its notching techni-que a
success in controlling the pressures exerted by the over-
laying Deer Creek barrier.
MSHA did not monitor Cottonwood's implementation of the
approved notch plan in 5th left and there was no evidence
that there was any further communication between Cottonwood
and MSHA about the plan or mining conditions until after the
bounce in 4th left in May 1994.
There was evidence of only two events at MSHA connected with
Cottonwood's notch plan between February 4, 1994, and May
16, 1994, neither of which involved anyone from the company.
First, almost six weeks after MSHA's approval of
Cottonwood's pillar notch plan, Mr. Ropchan said he prepared
a memorandum about his recollection of the subjects
discussed in the February 4, 1994, conference call but he
did not send a copy of his memorandum to anyone at
Cottonwood or MSHA. (Ex. G-6; Tr. 174). Second,
Mr. Hansen testified that sometime after the conference call
he developed computer simulations to evaluate mining methods
that he thought could be used to notch the pillars under the
plan. (Tr. 126). He used generic assumptions; he did not
visit the Cottonwood Mine nor collect data about it to conduct
this analysis. (Tr. 150). Mr. Hansen never discussed the
results of his analysis with Cottonwood, nor did he provide the
company with a copy of his results. (Tr. 164). Mr. Ropchan and
Mr. Hansen had no further involvement in these issues. (Hansen,
Tr.98, 141; Ropchan, Tr. 181, 189).
X
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NOTCH PLAN, 4TH LEFT SECTION
Gatewood development in 4th left, the panel immediately
south of 5th left, commenced after the notch plan had been
implemented successfully in 5th left. The layout of the 4th
left section was identical to that in 5th left with respect
to pillar size and configuration. The 1991 pillars in 4th
left were notched successfully under the procedures
established in the notch plan. New gateroad development
began in 4th left precisely as it had in 5th left. The #1,
#2 and #3 entries were driven up to the place where #5
crosscut was to be cut. (Tr. 273-74). On Friday, May 13,
1994, a minor, non-reportable bounce occurred along the
north rib of the #1 entry. Supplemental timber support was
set in the #1 entry near crosscut #4. (Tr. 361).
XI
THE MAY 16TH BOUNCE IN 4TH LEFT SECTION
On the morning of May 16, 1994, because the north rib of
the #1 entry had been unstable the preceding Friday, Lester
Jorgen-sen, shift foreman, instructed Leonard Reid, section
foreman, to mine crosscut #5 from entry #2 to #1 to keep the
miners away from the north rib of entry #1, even though
mining the crosscut in this direction was against
ventilation. Mr. Jorgensen wanted the crosscut mined in
this fashion to protect the miners from a potential outburst
from the north rib along the #1 entry.
At the start of the day shift on May 16, 1994, the continu-
ous mining machine was in the #2 entry in 4th left. The #5
crosscut had been started from the #2 entry but could not be
driven from the #2 to the #1 entry as planned because the #1
entry had not been entirely bolted by the end of the shift
on the preceding work day. The floor of that entry was
partially ob-structed by sloughage from the bounce the
preceding Friday; loose coal had been pushed toward the end
of that entry and had to be removed before bolting could be
completed. Under its mine plan, Cottonwood cannot break a
crosscut through to an unbolted entry. (Tr. 429). The
continuous miner was brought from the #2 entry to the #1
entry to clean the entry. After that task was completed,
the continuous miner was moved to the #3 entry so the roof
bolt-ing machine could be set up in the #1 entry to bolt the
roof in the remaining 35-40 feet still unbolted. (Tr. 368,
397). When the bolting was completed in the #1 entry, the
continuous miner was to be brought to the #2 entry to cut
the #5 crosscut through to the #1 entry. After the #5
crosscut was bolted, and the ven-tilation established, the
next step was to cut a notch in the newly created pillar
between the #4 and #5 crosscuts as required by the notch
plan. However, operations were interrupted when a rib
bounce occurred at 12:38 p.m. The bounce blew coal from
newly exposed ribs into the #1 entry, into the #4 crosscut
and into the #2 entry for a short distance. Although a roof
bolting crew was in #1 entry when the bounce occurred, no
one was in-jured. (Tr. 277).
Although the outburst was an instantaneous release of
pressure with considerable force there was little damage.
(Tr. 340). [2] The bounce was reported to MSHA because
production was stopped for more than one hour, in most part
due to the disrup-tion to ventilation and the Company's
investigation of the event.
Carl Pollastro, the Mine Superintendent, was notified
of the bounce by Leonard Reid and immediately went to 4th
left to investigate. James Baker, an MSHA inspector, and Jan
Lyall, an MSHA inspector trainee, were at the mine for a
regular inspection when the bounce occurred and Mr.
Pollastro told them about it. In-spector Baker and Mr.
Lyall also went to 4th left.
XII
THE CITATION
MSHA Inspector Baker inspected the area on May 16th right
after the bounce and issued a 103(k) order to "contro[l] the
area until [he] could complete an investigation." Later in
the day Baker terminated the 103(k) order and allowed
Cottonwood to continue developing the 4th left gateroads
without any change in mining procedures. He allowed
Cottonwood to complete the #5 crosscut to define the pillar
between the #4 and #5 crosscuts before cutting the notch
into the newly created pillar. (Tr. 92). Baker did not
issue a citation on May 16, 1994, or during the following
two weeks.
Inspector Baker returned to the mine over the next two days
to interview mine personnel and on May 19, 1994, accompanied
Warren Andrews, of Denver Technical Support, who conducted a
technical investigation of the bounce. Mr. Andrews took
photos of the bounce area in 4th left and eventually
prepared a report. Baker did not learn of Andrews' report
for several months.
Mr. Baker prepared MSHA's official accident investigation
report. (Ex. G-2). This report was released on October 7,
1994. Baker concluded that the block of coal bounded on
three sides by the #1 and #2 entries and the #4 crosscut
should have been notched prior to the bounce (Tr. 47), and
before #1 entry was advanced to where it would intersect the
#5 crosscut. However, Baker was unsure whether his
suggested sequence of mining would have prevented a bounce;
he believed "it may have prevented it. It may not." (Tr.
47-48). Baker could not conclude definitively that the
actions of the mining crew in 4th left caused or affect-ed
the bounce in any way. (Tr. 84).
On June 1, 1994, Mr. Baker, two weeks after his first
investigation of the bounce, issued a citation to Cottonwood,
alleging a violation of 30 C.F.R. � 75.202(a), not because
of his conclu-sions about when the notch should have been
cut but because, in his opinion, "no steps were taken to
prevent the bounce that could have seriously injured those
two roofbolters that were working in that #1 entry." (See
Citation 3588448, Ex. G-1; Tr. 48). Had the roofbolters not
been in the #1 entry when the bounce occurred--for example,
if the bounce had occurred when no work was being done, or
if the roofbolters had been elsewhere at the time of the
bounce--Baker would not have issued any citation for the
bounce. It is undisputed that no violation of Cotton-wood's
roof control plan occurred.
XIII
THE ABATEMENT
To abate the citation, MSHA required Cottonwood to submit
a revised notch plan. The revised plan limited the length the
#1 and #2 entries could be driven before a notch was cut in
newly developed pillars. In other words, MSHA required a
notch to be driven on the advance of the #1 entry. The
revised plan required by MSHA to abate the citation did not
require Cottonwood to develop the new pillars in any
different or smaller configuration and the layout of the
gateroads in 4th left and the gateroads in the remaining
sections to be developed under the plan (3rd left and 2nd
left) were identical to the layouts specified in the
original notch plan submitted by Energy West and approved by
MSHA. The citation was abated after Cottonwood submitted
this revised plan.
XIV
CONCLUSION
The citation issued by MSHA Inspector Baker two weeks
after he first investigated the May 16th outburst charges
Cottonwood with the violation of 30 C.F.R. � 75.202(a). It
alleges that "The operator failed to protect persons from
the hazards related to falls of roof, face, or ribs and
outbursts as a coal outburst (bounce) occurred in the 4th
left section ... ." (The citation does not mention the fact
no one was injured.)
Section 75.202(a) is not a strict liability standard. It
does not impose liability whenever a "bounce" occurs. To
establish a violation, the Secretary, by a preponderance of
evidence, must demonstrate a lack of reasonable care on the
part of the operator. Under the Commission decision in
Canon Coal Co., 8 FMSHRC 667 (1987) to prove a violation of
30 C.F.R.
� 75.202(a) the Secretary must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence a lack of reasonable care on
the part of the mine operator. To determine if the standard
has been violated, an objective standard of a reasonably
prudent person is applicable. In the present case I find
that a preponderance of the evidence presented fails to
prove that Cottonwood acted in any manner other than that of
reasonably prudent person, familiar with the mining industry
and the protective purpose of the standard, in both
recognizing potential outburst hazards and in undertaking
measures designed to avoid those hazards.
In this case there was commendable cooperation and earnest
work by both the operator and MSHA to prevent any
significant coal outburst. In spite of their best efforts,
the May 16th outburst did occur. Fortunately no one was
injured.
It is only by hindsight that MSHA speculates that perhaps
notching pillar No. 5 even before it was completely formed
"may" have prevented the bounce. Inspector Baker who issued
the citation testified "it may have prevented it. It may
not." (Tr. 84).
Having considered the hearing evidence and the record as a
whole, I find that a preponderance of the substantial,
reliable, and probative evidence fails to establish the
violation of 30 C.F.R. � 75.202(a).
ORDER
Citation No. 3588448 and its corresponding proposed penalty
are VACATED and this case is DISMISSED.
August F. Cetti
Administrative Law Judge
**FOOTNOTES**
[1]: The terms "coal outburst" and "pillar bounce" for
purposes of this decision are used interchangeably and
essentially mean the same condition. The Dictionary of Mining,
Mineral and Related Terms defines a bounce: a. a sudden spalling
off of the sides of ribs and pillars due to excess pressure; a
bump. .... (United States Bureau of Mines), 1967 Edition.
The bounce knocked down the ventilation line curtain and
dislodged approximately eight of the square set timbers set in
the area on the previous Friday. (Tr. 346, 403). The concussion
from the bounce also dislodged part of an overcast. (Tr. 276,
347, 403). There was no damage to the roof. (Tr. 79, 346).
Distribution:
Robert A. Cohen, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of
Labor, 4015 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22203
(Certified Mail)
Timothy M. Biddle, Esq., Lisa A. Price, Esq., CROWELL & MORING, 1001
Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20004-2595
(Certified Mail)
/sh