<DOC>
[DOCID: f:w-95-27.wais]

 
TWENTYMILE COAL COMPANY
May 7, 1996
WEST 95-27-D


        FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

                    1244 SPEER BOULEVARD #280
                      DENVER, CO 80204-3582
                  303-844-3577/FAX 303-844-5268


                           May 7, 1996

ROSS S. STEWART,              :    DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDING
               Complainant    :
                              :    Docket No. WEST 95-27-D
          v.                  :
                              :
TWENTYMILE COAL COMPANY,      :    Foidel Creek Mine
               Respondent     :

                            DECISION

Appearances:  Brian L. Lewis, Esq., Denver,
              Colorado, for Complainant;
              R. Henry Moore, Esq., Buchanan Ingersoll,
              Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
              for Respondent.

Before:  Judge Manning

     This case is before me on a complaint of discrimination
brought by Ross S. Stewart against Twentymile Coal Company
("Twentymile") under section 105(c) of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. � 815(c)(1988)("Mine Act").
For the reasons set forth below, I find that Mr. Stewart did not
establish that his discharge by Twentymile was motivated by his
protected activity. Accordingly, I find that Mr. Stewart was not
discriminated against by Twentymile in violation of the Mine Act.

     Mr. Stewart filed a discrimination complaint with the
Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration
("MSHA") pursuant to section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act, 30
U.S.C. � 815(c)(2). MSHA concluded that the facts disclosed
during its investigation did not constitute a violation of
section 105(c).  Mr. Stewart then instituted this proceeding
before the Commission pursuant to section 105(c)(3), 30 U.S.C.
� 815(c)(3).  A hearing was held in Steamboat Springs, Colorado.
The parties presented testimony and documentary evidence, and
filed post-hearing briefs.

                        FINDINGS OF FACT

     Mr. Stewart was employed by Twentymile at the Foidel Creek
Mine for about ten years.  During that period, he held a number of
positions with Twentymile and was a shuttle car operator at the time
of his discharge.  The Foidel Creek Mine is an under ground coal mine
in Routt County, Colorado, and employs about 280 people.

     On the day shift of May 16, 1994, Mr. Stewart was operating
a shuttle car in a continuous miner section.  The section was
developing entries in preparation for longwall mining.
Two shuttle cars weretransporting coal from the continuous mining
machine to the belt.  The shuttle cars dumped the coal at the feeder
breaker for the belt.  In a typical shift, Mr. Stewart would make about
50 trips from the continuous miner to the feeder breaker.  A shuttle
car is a large piece of mobile mining equip- ment.  The operator sits
in a small compartment and faces the opposite side of the shuttle car.
He can see to the front and back of the shuttle car through openings in
the operator's compartment.

     Allen Meckley was Mr. Stewart's supervisor from late Septem-
ber 1993 through May 16, 1994.  On May 16 Mr. Meckley was in the vicinity
of the feeder breaker when he observed Mr. Stewart dump several loads of
coal.  On one trip Mr. Meckley noticed that the conveyor on the shuttle
car continued to operate after all of the coal was dumped.  (Tr. 419).
Because Mr. Stewart did not back away from the feeder breaker after the
coal was dumped, Mr. Meck- ley was concerned that Mr. Stewart was asleep.
(Tr. 431, 499).  Meckley approached the shuttle car and stood to the side
of the operator's compartment.  Mr. Stewart did not react to his presence.
(Tr. 500).  Mr. Stewart's head was down, his hands were in his lap, and
Mr. Meckley believed that his eyes were closed.  (Tr. 30, 154-55, 430, 500-01).
The conveyor of the shuttle car was still running. (Tr. 27, 154).  Meckley
tapped Stewart on the shoulder.  When Stewart looked up, Meckley said, "Ross,
are you sick?"  (Tr. 28, 419, 501).  Mr. Stewart replied, "No."  Id.  Meckley
told Stewart to park his shuttle car and get his lunch.  They then proceeded out
of the mine.  On the way out Meckley said, "I think you know why we are going
outside, I told you the next time I caught you sleeping we were going out.
"  (Tr. 32-33, 157, 435, 501-02).  Mr. Stewart replied, "Yeh, I know"
or "If that's what you want to call it."  (Tr. 33, 435).

     At the surface, Mr. Stewart was advised that he was suspended pending an
investigation as to the appropriate discipline.  Mine management conducted
an investigation into the matter, met with Mr. Stewart to obtain his views,
and reached the conclusion that he should be terminated for sleeping on the job.
In reach- ing this conclusion, management took into consideration Mr. Meckley's
belief that he caught Mr. Stewart sleeping underground in October 1993 and in
December 1993.  Mr. Stewart admits that he was drowsy when Mr. Meckley observed
him in December 1993, but denies that he was asleep on May 16, 1994.  (Tr. 143-44).

     Mr. Stewart maintains that he was terminated for engaging in
activities that are protected under section 105(c)(1) of the Mine Act.
30 U.S.C. � 815(c)(1). First, he contends that he com- plained to

management that Mr. Meckley and other members of
the crew reported to work with the smell of
alcohol on their breath.  Second, he argues that
he complained about the safety of the wheel rims
on his shuttle car.  Third, he maintains that he
testified at a hearing before former Administrative
Law Judge John A. Morris in a discrimination proceeding
brought by Fred Peters against Twentymile.  Mr. Stewart
contends that these activities were protected under the
Mine Act and that he was terminated, at least in part,
because of these activities.

                       SUMMARY OF THE LAW

     Section 105(c)(1) of the Mine Act protects miners from
retaliation for exercising rights protected under the Mine Act.
The purpose of the protection is to encourage miners "to play
an active part in the enforcement of the Act" recognizing that,
"if miners are to be encouraged to be active in matters of safety
and health, they must be protected against any possible discrimination
which they might suffer as a result of their participation."
S. Rep. No. 181, tb Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1977), reprinted in Senate
Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977, at 623 (1978).

     A miner alleging discrimination under the Mine Act estab-
lishes a prima facie case by proving that he engaged in protected
activity and that the adverse action complained of was motivated
in any part by that activity.  Secretary on behalf of Pasula v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 2 FMSHRC 2786, 2799-2800 (October 1980),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Marshall,
663 F.2d 1211(3d Cir. 1981).  The mine operator may rebut the\
prima facie case by showing either that no protected activity
occurred or that the adverse action was in no way motivated by
the protected activity.  Secretary on Behalf of Robinette v.
United Castle Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC 803, 817-18 (April 1981).
If an operator cannot rebut the prima facie case in this manner,
it may nevertheless affirmatively defend by proving that it was
also motivated by the miner's unprotected activity and would have
taken the adverse action in any event for the unprotected activity
alone. Haro v. Magma Copper Co., 1935, 1937 (November1982).

     Because direct evidence of actual discriminatory motive is
rare, illegal motive may be established through circumstantial
evidence or a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent.
Secretary on behalf of Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 FMSHRC 2508,
2510-11 (November 1981), rev'd on other grounds subnom. Donovan
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 709 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  Examples of
circumstantial evidence that tend to show discriminatory intent
on the part of the mine operator include:  (1) knowledge of the
protected activity; (2) hostility or animus towards the protected
activity; (3) coincidence in time between the protected activity
and the adverse action; and (4) disparate treatment of the complainant.
Chacon, 3 FMSHRC at 2510.

            DISCUSSION WITH FURTHER FINDINGS OF FACT
                               AND
                       CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

     There is no doubt that Mr. Stewart had a statutory right to
voice his concerns about the safety of his workplace without fear
of retribution by management.  I find that Mr. Stewart's com-
plaints about alcohol use and the safety of the wheel rims of the
shuttle car, and his testimony at the Peters hearing were protected
under the Mine Act.  The issue is whether his discharge was
motivated in any part by this protected activity.

1.  Testimony at the Peters Hearing

     Mr. Stewart was subpoenaed to testify at hearing before
former Administrative Law Judge John A. Morris in Fred L.
Peters v. Twentymile Coal Company.  Mr. Stewart contends
that Twenty-mile's decision to terminate him was motivated,
at least in part, by the fact that he testified in this
proceeding.  The hearing was held on December 8, 1992.  The
adverse action in that case was a letter of discipline that
was placed in Mr. Peters' file.  In his decision, Judge
Morris dismissed the discrimination com-plaint because he
determined that the adverse action was not motivated in any
part by Mr. Peters' protected activity.  15 FMSHRC 704, 734
(April 1993).  Stewart believes that his partici-pation in
the hearing angered mine management.  He points to the fact
that other employees were allowed to carry over vacation
time from one year to the next and that he lost vacation
days because he did not use them by a certain date.  (Tr.
60-63).  He attributes this disparate treatment to the fact
that he testified at the Peters hearing.  (Tr. 61).

     I find that Mr. Stewart's termination was not motivated
in any part by the fact that he testified at the Peters
hearing.  First, it is worth noting that Mr. Peters, the
complainant in that case, is still employed by Twentymile.
It is highly unlike-ly that Twentymile would be motivated,
in whole or in part, to terminate an employee because he
testified under subpoena in a Commission proceeding while
retaining the employee who brought the case in the first
place.  Other miners were subpoenaed to testify in that case
and did not suffer any adverse consequences. (Tr. 105-07).
It does not appear from the judge's decision that Mr.
Stewart's testimony was particularly important in that case.

     Mr. Stewart lost his vacation days well before the Peters
hearing.  The record demonstrates that a number of employees
including Mr. Stewart were allowed to carry over 1991
vacation leave into early 1992.  He lost the vacation days
that he carried over because he did not use them by March
31, 1992.[1]  The Peters hearing was held on December 8,
1992.  Thus, he did not lose vacation days in retaliation
for his testimony.

     Finally, I credit the testimony of the applicable
management witnesses that they did not consider the fact that
he testified in the Peters case when they determined that
Stewart should be terminated.  Mr. Meckley was not involved
in the Peters case and was an hourly employee at the time of
the hearing.  Ronald K. Spangler, Twentymile's manager of
human resources, was a key player in the decision to
terminate Mr. Stewart.  He was not employed by Twentymile at
the time of the Peters hearing.Mr. Spangler testified that,
during his investigation of the Stewart matter, the Peters
hearing was only mentioned once. He was told by Daryl Firestone
that Mr. Stewart was under the mis-taken belief that Twentymile
management was mad at him for testi-fying at the Peters hearing.
(Tr. 298, 350-51).  Mr. Firestone was Peters' supervisor who
issued the disciplinary letter that was the subject of that case.
Mr. Spangler further testified that Firestone told him that
Stewart's testimony was "more in favor of the Company."  Id.
Mr. Firestone testified that he was present when Stewart
testified at the Peters hearing and believed that his
testimony supported the company.  (Tr. 634, 636).  I
conclude that Mr. Spangler did not consider Stewart's
participa- tion at the Peters hearing when he recommended to
the general manager that Stewart be terminated.  William
Ivy, general manager at Twentymile, made the ultimate
decision to terminate Mr. Stewart and he testified that
Stewart's participation in the Peters hearing was not a factor
in his decision to terminate Mr. Stewart.  (Tr. 595).

2.  Split Rim Complaint

     In May 1991, Mr. Stewart refused to operate his shuttle
car because he believed it to be unsafe.  (Tr. 97-98; Ex. R-4).
Spe-  cifically, he complained about the split rim wheel
assembly on the shuttle car.  He contends that the rim
exploded and a nearby miner could have been injured.  (Tr.
54-55).  Each wheel rim on his shuttle car consisted of two
pieces that were designed to be held together by the air
pressure in the tire.  Mr. Stewart be- lieved that the rims
were faulty and created a safety hazard.  There is no
question that this complaint was protected under the Mine
Act.

     I find, however, that Mr. Stewart's termination was not
motivated in any part by his complaint.  The split rim
incident was remote in time from the events in May 1994 that
resulted in his termination.  Mr. Meckley was not his
supervisor in May 1991, but was an hourly employee on his
crew.  He has no recollection of the complaint.  (Tr. 468-
69).  Mr. Spangler did not work for Twentymile at the time
of the split rim complaint and did not learn about it until
after Mr. Stewart was terminated.  (Tr. 323).  Mr. Stewart
did not raise this issue with Mr. Spangler during their
meeting of June 2, 1994, when he was given the opportunity
to present his views.  (Ex. R-18).  Mr. Ivy, the general
manager, testified that he remembers hearing that about
problems with the rims but he does not recall any of the
details.  (Tr. 602).

     When Mr. Stewart complained about the safety of the wheel
rims, his supervisor, Mr. Firestone, looked into the matter.
(Tr. 637-38).  Mr. Stewart's complaint was that the locking
ring tab was not connected on the wheel rim.  (Tr. 88, 539,
637-38, 656).  Mr. Firestone discussed the matter with the
shift foreman. Id.   Joseph F. Hampton, a maintenance
supervisor, and William G. Kendall, the manager of
maintenance for Twentymile, called the company that supplied
tires and rims for the mine.  (Tr. 540, 656-57).  The
supplier replied that the locking tabs are neces- sary only
when the tire is being inflated and that they were not
necessary after that.  (Tr. 540, 659-62).  Mr. Kendall met
with a representative of the rim supplier to discuss the
split rim is- sue.  He circulated a memorandum on May 24,
1991, explaining why the locking tabs are not necessary
after the tire is inflated.  (Tr. 658-59; Ex. R-4).  Mr.
Hampton also discussed the matter with Stewart.  (Tr. 541-
42).

     Mr. Stewart relies heavily on the fact that Twentymile
had to scrap the wheel rims on his shuttle car as a result of
his complaint, at a cost of up to $24,000.00,[2] and that
the shuttle car was shut down for several hours.  The record
reveals that the rims had to be replaced because Frank
Pavlisick, a maintenance foreman, welded the two parts of
the wheel rims together without consulting his supervisors.
(Tr. 662-63).  The welding was un- safe and damaged the
wheel rims.  Id.   It is apparent that mine management was
concerned about the welding rather than Mr. Stew- art's
safety complaint.  (Tr. 663).  There is no credible evi-
dence that the company held Mr. Stewart accountable for this
matter.  In addition, I cannot draw a reasonable inference
of  discriminatory intent.  Management handled his complaint
with the same degree of concern that it does all safety
complaints.  The record makes it clear that employees
frequently shut down equip- ment for safety reasons and that
employees are not disciplined for such conduct.  Mr. Stewart
did not have a history of shutting down equipment for safety
reasons.  (Tr. 98).  He was not discip- lined at the time of
these events and I find that his termination was not
motivated, directly or indirectly, by this safety complaint.

3.  Alcohol Use Complaints

     Mr. Stewart complained to management that miners were
coming to work with the smell of alcohol on their breath.  His
concern was that the miners' judgment could be impaired and
that mine safety was affected.  Mr. Stewart testified that
about four or five miners would come to work with the smell
of alcohol on their breath.  (Tr. 42-43).  One of these
miners was Allen Meckley, who was a bolter on his crew at
the time.  Stewart contends that when Meckley became his
supervisor in September 1993, Meckley set out to get him
fired in retaliation for his protected activity.  He
believes that Meckley harbored a grudge against him because
of these complaints.

     All of the evidence relied upon by Mr. Stewart is circum-
stantial.  Mr. Stewart maintains that Mr. Meckley was
overtly hostile from the moment he became his supervisor.
He argues that the issue of whether Twentymile had cause to
discharge him "boils down to a `swearing contest' between
Mr. Stewart and Mr. Meck- ley."  (Br. at 5).  Stewart
contends that because Meckley had an ulterior motive for
alleging that he was sleeping, Meckley's testimony should
not be credited.  Mr. Stewart points to the fact that
Meckley admitted that Stewart did not get along well with
his fellow crew members.  (Br. 7; Tr. 475).  Stewart
contends that the crew had a grudge against him because he
was a "snitch".  He points to the testimony of Charles L.
Moss to support his position.  Moss testified that when he
was the crew's foreman, one of the crew members complained
to him that Stewart was a snitch.  (Tr. 180).  In addition,
Stewart testified that Hansel Burum, a former member of the
crew, told him that he was a snitch.  (Tr. 66).  Finally,
Stewart heard rumors in Craig, Colorado, where he lived,
that "Allen [Meckley] finally got me."  (Tr. 73).

     Mr. Stewart discussed his concern about alcohol use with
several of the mine's supervisors.  When Mr. Moss was his
super- visor, he complained that members of the crew had
alcohol on their breath.  (Tr. 182-83).  On at least one
occasion, Mr. Moss checked it out and could not detect any
alcohol on the individu- al's breath.  (Tr. 190-91).  Around
February 1993, Stewart com- plained to Mr. Ivy about alcohol
abuse at the mine.  (Tr. 47-49, 112, 389, 595-99).   He did
not name any particular individuals.  Mr. Ivy discussed the
issue in a general manner at a crew meet-ting.  Apparently
several members of the crew made snide comments to Stewart
about this.  Mr. Meckley, who was a bolter at the

     time, did not make any comments.  (Tr. 118).  Stewart also
testified that he complained to Meckley, when Meckley was
his supervisor.  (Tr. 42-47).  Stewart said that Meckley did
not have any particular response.  Meckley could not recall any
such discussion.  (Tr. 469).

     There is no direct evidence linking Mr. Stewart's termina-
tion with his complaints about alcohol use.  Mr. Stewart
main-tains that there is "ample circumstantial indicia of
discrimina-tory intent ... ."  (Reply Br. at 4).  I used a
two-step process to analyze this issue.  First, I considered
the guidelines set forth by the Commission in Chacon, 3
FMSHRC at 2510, to determine whether I could draw a
reasonable inference of discriminatory intent.  Second, I
examined the facts surrounding Mr. Stewart's termination to
determine whether his termination appeared to be internally
consistent with Twentymile's position.

     The first factor set forth in Chacon is whether the company
had knowledge of the protected activity.  I find that there
is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that
Meckley had knowledge of Mr. Stewart's complaints about
alcohol use, despite the fact that he could not recall such
complaints at the hearing.  Mr. Spangler testified that he
did not know that Mr. Stewart had complained about alcohol
use at the time he recommended that Mr. Stewart be terminated
for sleeping on the job.  (Tr. 323).  He was not employed at
Twentymile at the time of the complaints.  Mr. Hampton could
not recall that Mr. Stewart complained about alcohol use.
(Tr. 554).  Mr. Ivy remembers meeting with Stewart at the end
of a shift in February 1993, but could not recall the contents
of the discussion.  (Tr. 595-96).  Mr. Ivy stated that they may
have discussed alcohol and he may have raised it at a crew meeting.
(Tr. 596-97).  Accordingly, I find that mine man- agement had
knowledge of the protected activity.

     The next factor is whether there was hostility or animus
towards the protected activity.  I find that circumstantial
evi- dence does not establish such hostility or animus.
Management witnesses testified that they would not tolerate
miners coming to work under the influence of alcohol or
drugs.  (Tr. 182, 595-96).  I credit this testimony.  There
is no evidence, other than the testimony of Mr. Stewart,
that anyone came to work with alcohol on his breath or was
under the influence of alcohol at the mine.[3]  Mr. Meckley
denied that he ever came to work with alcohol on his breath
and does not remember the issue being raised.  (Tr. 469-70).
Mr. Moss testified that when he was the crew's supervisor,

     Meckley never came to work with alcohol on his breath.
(Tr.182).  Some of Stewart's fellow crew members mocked him
about his complaints in 1993 but I cannot draw an inference
that this was a factor in his termination.  Mr. Stewart
relies on the fact that he did not get along with the other
members of the crew to estab- lish that there was hostility
towards his protected activity.  I find that the animus
directed towards Mr. Stewart by the crew and his immediate
supervisors was the result of the fact that they believed
that he did not pull his weight on the crew.  (Tr. 179-181,
183-84, 187-89, 193, 195-6, 207-08, 211-12, 322-23, 465,
475-76, 488-89, 544-46, 554, 641, 647).  I cannot ascertain
whether or not Mr. Stewart was a hard worker, but the
evidence shows that he was perceived as someone who was
reluctant to help others on the crew and the crew sometimes
gave him a hard time as a result.  Id.

     The third Chacon factor is the coincidence in time between
the protected activity and the adverse action.  Mr.
Stewart's complaints about alcohol use occurred well before
his termina- tion.  He was very vague about when he made
these complaints, but it is clear that the complaint to the
general manager was made around February 1993, about 15
months before his discharge.
Mr. Meckley was his supervisor for about eight of these
months.  While it is certainly possible for a supervisor to
hold a grudge for 15 months and take action in retaliation
in the manner de- scribed by Mr. Stewart, I cannot make such
an inference in this case.  The linkage is simply too
tenuous to reach such a conclusion.

     The final factor is whether there was disparate treatment of
the complainant.  This factor is difficult to analyze
because there is no evidence that other employees complained
that miners were coming to work with the smell of alcohol on
their breath.  As stated above, however, I credit the
testimony of management witnesses that the company would not
tolerate employees coming to work under the influence of
alcohol.  In addition, other employ- ees who were caught
sleeping at work were terminated unless man- agement
determined that there were mitigating circumstances.  One
employee was discharged for sleeping underground.  (Tr. 395-
96).  Two other employees were caught sleeping in a truck on
the sur- face and were given a two-week suspension, lost all
bonus pay, and were placed on probation for a year.  (Tr.
224, 393). Mr. Spangler determined that they should not be
terminated be- cause it was a first offense, they were not
operating equipment at the time, their supervisor was against
termination, and they cooperated during Twentymile's
investigation of the incident.  (Tr. 391-94).  I credit Mr.
Spangler's testimony describing the reasons why Mr. Stewart
was terminated and these other two miners were not.  I find
that Mr. Stewart failed to establish disparate
treatment.  I cannot draw a reasonable inference that he was
treated differently because of his safety complaints.[4]

     Twentymile's stated reason for terminating Mr. Stewart is
consistent with the evidence.  The testimony about the
events of May 16, 1994, differ in some of the details.
Stewart testified that Meckley approached him from the left
and tapped him on his left shoulder, while Meckley testified
that he observed Stewart from the right side and tapped his
right shoulder.  (Tr. 423-26, 693).  Stewart testified that
Meckley could not have determined that his eyes were closed
or that he was sleeping because of the design of the cab on
the shuttle car.  (Tr. 22)  He further stated that Meckley's
testimony that he tapped Stewart on the right shoulder is
not credible because the right side of the shuttle car was
against the coal feeder.  (Tr. 693-94).  Meckley testified
that there was enough space for him to stand to the right of
the cab.  (Tr. 422-24; Ex. R-39).  Stewart testified that
his eyes were open and that he kept the conveyor on his
shuttle car running to make sure that all of the coal was
dis- charged onto the feeder breaker.  (Tr. 29-31).  He
testified that he had on his ear plugs and did not see or
hear Meckley until he tapped him on his shoulder.  Id.  He
stated that he immediately turned to Meckley and asked him
what he wanted.  Id.

     These discrepancies are not as significant as Mr. Stewart
believes and do not provide a basis for discrediting
Meckley's testimony.  I find that Mr. Meckley had an honest,
good faith belief that Mr. Stewart was asleep on May 16,
1996.  I also find that Meckley believed that Stewart was
asleep in his shuttle car at the feeder in October 1993.
(Tr. 445-47).  Meckley verbally warned him not to sleep
underground.  Id.  Meckley also believed that Stewart was
asleep on December 21, 1993.  In that incident, the operator
of the continuous miner and Meckley signaled Stewart to tram
his shuttle car forward to be loaded with coal. (Tr. 448-
49).  Stewart did not respond to the signal.  Meckley
approached Stewart and said, "Ross, Ross, you need to get a
load."  (Tr. 449).

     Mr. Spangler had worked at Twentymile for about six weeks
when Stewart was suspended on May 16.  As the human
resources manager, he was responsible for investigating the
incident.  He performed a thorough, independent and
professional investigation into the matter.  I find his
testimony to be particularly persua- sive and credible.  He
made several attempts to get Stewart's position on the
incident.  Mr. Spangler believes that Stewart was
uncooperative and evasive during the investigation.  As
discussed above, Spangler knew very little about any of
Stewart's protected activities and knew nothing about his
complaints concerning the smell of alcohol.  I credit his
testimony that Stewart's protec- ted activities were not a
factor he considered in recommending that he be terminated.
I believe that if Meckley had set Stewart up in retaliation
for his safety complaints, it is likely that Spangler would
have uncovered it.

     Mr. Stewart contends that Twentymile's hostility toward him
can be inferred because of its "irregular handling of [his]
ter- mination."  (Br. at 9).  He bases this argument on the
fact that Mr. Meckley's notes regarding the sleeping
incidents were not kept in Stewart's personnel file and the
company failed to follow its own internal disciplinary
procedures.  Twentymile's discipli- nary system is rather
informal and subjective.  It has a set of procedures known
as the Green Answer Book, that it follows when dealing with
personnel issues.  (Ex. R-28).  I find that Twenty-mile
generally followed its procedures and Mr. Spangler gave
Mr. Stewart an opportunity to present any mitigating
factors.  The Mine Act does not mandate any particular type
of disciplinary system.  I do not have the authority to
determine whether Mr. Stewart's discharge was fair or reasonable.
The "Commission does not sit as a super grievance board to judge
the industrial merits, fairness, reasonableness, or wisdom
of an operator's employment policies except insofar as those
policies may conflict with rights granted under section
105(c) of the Mine Act."  Delisio v. Mathies Coal Co., 12
FMSHRC 2535, 2544 (December 1990)
(citations omitted).

     I conclude that Mr. Stewart's discharge did not violate
section 105(c) of the Mine Act.  I find that Mr. Stewart
engaged in protected activity but that his termination was
not motivated in any part by his protected activity.  I also
find that, even if his protected activity were a factor, he
would have been termi- nated in any event for his
unprotected activity alone.

                              ORDER

Accordingly, the complaint filed by Ross S. Stewart against
Twentymile Coal Company under section 105(c) of the Mine Act
is DISMISSED.


                              Richard W. Manning
                              Administrative Law Judge


Distribution:

Brian L. Lewis, Esq., 10200 E. Girard Avenue, No. B-233, Denver,
Colorado 80231-5508 (Certified Mail)

R. Henry Moore, Esq., BUCHANAN INGERSOLL, One Oxford Tower, 20th
Floor, 301 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1410
(Certified Mail)

RWM


**FOOTNOTES**

   Other  employees  who were allowed to carry over vacation days
from 1991 to 1992 did  not  lose  any  of this leave because they
used it before the deadline of March 31,  1992.  Mr. Stewart lost
10 days of vacation because he failed to use them in time, rather
than in retaliation for protected activity under the Mine Act.

  It is not clear from the record how many  of the rims had to be
replaced.  For the purposes of Mr. Stewart's  argument,  I assume
that all four were replaced.

   Mr. Peters, however, had been in alcohol abuse counseling  and
Mr.  Firestone  smelled  alcohol  on  his breath on one occasion.
(Tr. 639-40; 15 FMSHRC at 721).

  Mr. Stewart also contends that there were other instances where
he was mistreated because of his safety  complaints.   He  states
that  he  was  temporarily  transferred  to  another  crew,  tem-
porarily  removed  from his position as shuttle car operator, and
lost some vacation leave  because  of his protected activity.  He
did  not  lose any pay or benefits because  of  these  transfers.
Based on the  record, I find that the temporary reassignments and
loss of vacation  time  were  unrelated  to  any of his protected
activities.