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EAGLE ENERGY, INC.
January 12, 1999
WEVA 98-45-R


        FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

               OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                      2 SKYLINE, 10th FLOOR
                       5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                  FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA  22041


                        January 12, 1999

EAGLE ENERGY, INC.,             : CONTEST PROCEEDING
               Contestant       :
          v.                    : Docket No. WEVA 98-45-R
                                : Order  No.  7171660; 1/22/98
SECRETARY OF LABOR,             :
     MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH     : Mine No. 1
     ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),     : Mine ID 46-07711
               Respondent       :
                                :
SECRETARY OF LABOR,             : CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDINGS
     MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH     :
     ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),     : A.C. No. 46-07711-036660
          v.                    :
                                : Docket No. WEVA 98-69
EAGLE ENERGY INCORPORATED,      : A.C. No. 46-07711-03666
               Respondent       :
                                :       Mine No. 1
                                :
                                : Docket No. WEVA 98-81
                                : A.C. No. 46-07711-03670
                                :
                                : Mine No. 2

            ORDER DENYING EAGLE ENERGY INCORPORATED'S
                   MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

     Before me for consideration is Eagle Energy Incorporated's
(Eagle Energy's) December 15, 1998,  Motion to Compel the 
Secretary to produce the following:

     1. Copies of the  reports  of  the  health  and safety
     conferences conducted by representatives  of  the  Mine
     Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) with Eagle 
     Energy company officials on October 7, 1997 (2 pages),
     December 4 and 10, 1997 (5 pages), and February 26, 1998
     (2 pages);

     2. A copy of hand written notes by MSHA Supervisor Terry
     Price regarding his November 5, 1997, meeting with Eagle
     Energy company officials (1 page); and

     3.  A copy of a memorandum  dated  April 14, 1998, from 
     MSHA Conference  and Litigation Representative  Ira  Lee
     to the Secretary's counsel, Yoora Kim.

     The Secretary  filed  an Opposition to Eagle Energy's motion
to compel on December 17, 1998,  asserting  the health and safety
conference  reports as well as Price's notes of  his  November 5,
1997, meeting  are protected by the work product and deliberative
process privileges.  The Secretary's opposition also asserted the
April 14, 1998,  memorandum  from Lee to counsel was protected by
the  attorney-client privilege.   Eagle  Energy  replied  to  the
Secretary's opposition on December 31, 1998.  In its reply, Eagle
Energy conceded the Lee memorandum was protected by the attorney-
client  privilege.   However, Eagle Energy asserts the health and
safety conference reports  and  Price's  notes  are not protected
because they were prepared during the normal course of business.

     The Work Product Privilege

     Commission Procedural Rule 56(b), 29 C.F. R.  �  2700.56(b),
provides  that parties may obtain discovery of any  relevant
matter that  is  not privileged.  The work-product privilege has
been codified  in  Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.[1]  In ASARCO, Inc., 12  FMSHRC 2548 (December  1990),
the Commission discussed the work-product privilege, stating:

     In order to be protected by  this immunity under [Rule]
     26(b)(3), the material sought in discovery must be:

     1. "documents and tangible things;"

     2. "Prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial;"
     and

     3.  "by or for another party or by or for that party's
     representative."


               It is  not required that the document be
          prepared by or for an attorney.  If materials
          meet the tests  set  forth  above,  they  are 
          subject to discovery  "only  upon  a  showing 
          that   the   party   seeking   discovery  has  
          substantial need  of  the  materials  in  the 
          preparation of the party's case and  that the 
          party is unable  without  undue  hardship  to  
          obtain  the  substantial  equivalent  of  the 
          materials  by  other  means."  If  the  court  
          orders that the materials be produced because
          the required showing has been made, the court
          is   then   required   to   "protect  against  
          disclosure   of   the   mental   impressions, 
          conclusions, opinions, or legal  theories  of
          an attorney  or  other  representative  of  a  
          party  concerning  the litigation."

Id. at 2558 (citations omitted).   The  burden  of satisfying the
three-part  test  is  on  the party seeking to invoke  the  work-
product privilege, but once  that  party  has met its burden, the
burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure to make a requisite
showing  that  there is substantial need and  undue  hardship  to
overcome the privilege.   P.  &  B  Marina,  Ltd.  Partnership v.
Logrande,  136.  F.R.D. 50, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd,  983  F.2d
1047 (2d Cir. 1992).

     It is clear that the conference notes and the notes prepared
by MSHA Supervisor Price are "tangible documents" prepared "by or
for the Secretary."   The  dispositive  question  concerning  the
applicability  of  the  work  product  privilege is whether these
documents were "prepared in anticipation  of  litigation  or  for
trial."  Whether these documents are privileged because they were
prepared  with  litigation in mind must be based on the nature of
the documents and  the factual situation in each particular case.
ASARCO, 12 FMSHRC at  2558.   If the documents can fairly be said
to have been prepared because of the prospect of litigation, then
the documents are covered by the  privilege. Id. [citing Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure  �  2024  p.198-99 (1970)]
If,  on  the  other  hand,  litigation  is contemplated  but  the
document was prepared in the ordinary course  of  business rather
than  for  the purposes of litigation, it is not protected.   Id.
In addition,  particular  litigation  must be contemplated at the
time the document is prepared in order  for  the  document  to be
protected.  Id.

     Eagle  Energy  argues  the  subject  notes are not protected
because  they  were  made  in  the  ordinary course  of  business
regardless of whether litigation was  contemplated.   As asserted
by Eagle Energy, the question is whether MSHA reports of a safety
and  health  conference  are  routinely  prepared in the ordinary
course  of  business  without  regard  to whether  litigation  is
contemplated.  In addressing this question,  it  is  necessary to
analyze MSHA's procedures
for health and safety conferences contained in 30 C.F.R. � 100.6.
Operators that elect not to contest citations may decide  not  to
request  a  safety  and  health  conference.   Safety  and health
conferences are only conducted, subject to MSHA's approval,  upon
an operator's request.

30 C.F.R. �� 100.6(b) and (c).  Such conferences are the means by
which operators may submit mitigating information including facts
that  operators  believe  warrant  a  finding  that  no violation
occurred.  30 C.F.R. � 100.6(e).  Citations that are not  vacated
are referred by the safety and health conference official to  the
Office  of Assessments with the inspector's evaluation as a basis
for determining  the  appropriate  amount  of civil penalty to be
assessed.  30 C.F.R. �� 100.6(f)
and (g).

     Thus, generally, only contested citations  are  the subjects
of  safety  and health conferences.  Moreover, the MSHA  official
conducting the  conference  uses the information submitted by the
operator  as  a  basis  for  the  referral   to   the  Office  of
Assessments.  Upon receipt of a notice of proposed penalty issued
by the Office of Assessments, the operator has 30 days  to pay or
contest the proposed penalty.  30 C.F.R. � 100.7(b).  In essence,
the  safety  and  health  conference  is  the initial step in the
litigation process if the operator contests  the  proposed  civil
penalty.    Consequently,  such  conferences  are  not  routinely
conducted, but  rather,  they  are  conducted  when  an  operator
challenges the initial citation.  Accordingly, the notes of  such
conferences,  including  the  notes  of  Supervisor  Price,  were
prepared  in  contemplation  of  litigation  and,  as  such,  are
protected  by  the  work  product privilege.  Likewise, any notes
prepared by an operator's representatives during such conferences
are also protected.

     Having concluded that  the  conference reports and notes are
protected,  the  analysis  shifts to  whether  Eagle  Energy  can
overcome the privilege by demonstrating  a  substantial  need for
the  information,  and  establishing that it will suffer an undue
hardship if it must attempt  to  obtain  the information by other
means.  It is difficult for Eagle Energy to  make  such a showing
for  summaries  of  meetings  with MSHA conference officials  and
Price  that  were  attended by it  own  company  representatives.
General  assertions,  as  advanced  by  Eagle  Energy,  that  the
protected  material  is  needed  to compare present recollections
against prior statements, or for general purposes of impeachment,
are  not  sufficient  to  overcome the  work  product  privilege.
Consolidation Coal Company,  19 FMSHRC 1239, 1243-44 (July 1997).
Consequently, Eagle Energy has  failed to overcome the privilege,
and its motion to compel the safety and health conference reports
and Supervisor Price's notes shall be denied.[2]

     In the alternative, if Eagle  Energy does not prevail in its
motion to compel, it requests in camera review of the subject 
conference  reports  and  Price's notes  to  determine  if  they 
contain "purely factual materials" which are not protected.  It 
is  inappropriate  to  request  the trier  of  fact  to  review, 
in  camera,  protected work product documents   containing  trial
strategy,  opinions   or   other confidential information solely 
on  the  basis  of  mere  speculation  that  some severable,
purely factual material may exist.  Rather,  the proponent of the
in camera review must provide sufficient detail  identifying  the
nature  and  substance  of  the  factual  material  sought  to be
discovered.

     Commission Rule 56(c) permits the Judge, upon his own motion
to limit discovery to prevent undue burden or delay.  29 C.F.R. �
2700.56(c).   The discretion to order in camera review should  be
used judiciously.   The in camera review process must not be used
like  a  fishing expedition.   Accordingly,  absent  a  threshold
showing identifying  the  nature  of the information sought to be
discovered,  Eagle  Energy's request  for  in  camera  review  is
denied.

     Attorney-Client Privilege

     Eagle Energy, in  its reply to the Secretary's opposition 
to its  motion  to  compel,   concedes   the  April  14,  1998,
memorandum    from    MSHA    Conference    and   Litigation
Representative  Ira  Lee  to the Secretary's counsel,  Yoora
Kim, is protected by the attorney-client privilege.  (Reply,
pp.  16-17).  Therefore, I construe  Eagle  Energy  to  have
withdrawn its motion to compel the Lee memorandum.

     In view  of  the  above  Eagle  Energy's Motion to Compel IS
DENIED.


                                Jerold Feldman
                                Administrative Law Judge


Distribution:

Julia K.  Shreve,  Esq.,  Jackson & Kelly, 1600 Laidley Tower,
P.O. Box 553, Charleston, WV 25322 (Certified Mail)

Yoora  Kim,  Esq.,  Office  of  the Solicitor,   U.S.   
Department   of  Labor,     4015    Wilson    Blvd.,
Arlington,  VA   22203   (Certified  Mail)

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**FOOTNOTES**

     [1]:Commission   Procedural   Rule  1(b),  incorporates  the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so  far  as practicable, on any
procedural   question  not  regulated  by  the  Mine   Act,   the
Commission's Procedural  Rules,  or  the Administrative Procedure
Act.   Rule  26(b)(3)  of the Federal Rules  of  Civil  Procedure
provides in relevant part:

     [A]party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
     things otherwise discoverable  under subdivision (b)(1)
     of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
     or for trial by or for another party  or by or for that
     other  party's  representative  (including   the  other
     party's   attorney,   consultant,  surety,  indemnitor,
     insurer, or agent) only  upon  a showing that the party
     seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
     in the preparation of the party's  case  and  that  the
     party  is  unable  without undue hardship to obtain the
     substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
     In  ordering  discovery  of  such  materials  when  the
     required showing has been made, the court shall protect
     against disclosure  of mental impressions, conclusions,
     opinions, or legal theories  of  an  attorney  or other
     representative of a party concerning the litigation.

     [2]:  Having  determined the conference reports and
Price's   notes  are  protected  by  the  work  product
privilege, I need not address the Secretary's assertion
that  they  are  also  protected  by  the  deliberative
process privilege.   However,  I note that deliberative
process in contemplation of hearing  is protected under
the  work  product  doctrine.   See fn. 1  infra.   The
distinction  between  these  two  privileges  would  be
blurred if all deliberations in anticipation of hearing
were   also   covered   by  the  deliberative   process
privilege.   Rather,  the Commission  has  defined  the
deliberative process privilege  as  one which "attaches
to inter- and intra-agency communications that are part
of the deliberative process preceding  the adoption and
promulgation of an agency policy."  In re:  Contests of
Respirable Dust Sample Alteration Citations,  14 FMSHRC
987,  992 (June 1992) [quoting Jordan v. United  States
Dep't of  Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1978)].
It  has  neither   been  alleged  nor  shown  that  the
conference or Price  meeting  concerned the formulation
of agency policy.