FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1331 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W., SUITE 520N

WASHINGTON, DC 20004-1710

                                                

 

 

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

  MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH   

  ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)        

 

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HOWARD R. HENSLEY, employed by

  MILL BRANCH COAL CO.                                       

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Docket No. VA 2015-29

A.C. No. 44-07189-337390 A

 

                            

 

 

BEFORE:  Young, Nakamura, and Althen, Commissioners[1]

           

ORDER

 

BY THE COMMISSION:

                                                                                                                                                           

            This matter arises under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.    § 801 et seq. (2012) (“Mine Act”). On October 30, 2014, the Commission received a motion from Howard R. Hensley (“Hensley”) seeking to reopen a penalty assessment under section 110(c) of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820(c), that had become a final order of the Commission.

 

            Under the Commission’s Procedural Rules, an individual charged under section 110(c) has 30 days following receipt of the proposed penalty assessment within which to notify the Secretary of Labor that he or she wishes to contest the penalty. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.26. If the individual fails to notify the Secretary, the proposed penalty assessment is deemed a final order of the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.27.

 

            We have held, however, that in appropriate circumstances, we possess jurisdiction to reopen uncontested assessments that have become final Commission orders under section 105(a). Jim Walter Res., Inc., 15 FMSHRC 782, 786-89 (May 1993) (“JWR”). In evaluating requests to reopen final orders, the Commission has found guidance in Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which the Commission may relieve a party from a final order of the Commission on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or other reason justifying relief. See 29 C.F.R. § 2700.1(b) (“the Commission and its Judges shall be guided so far as practicable by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); JWR, 15 FMSHRC at 787. We have also observed that default is a harsh remedy and that, if the defaulting party can make a showing of good cause for a failure to timely respond, the case may be reopened and appropriate proceedings on the merits permitted. See Coal Prep. Servs., Inc., 17 FMSHRC 1529, 1530 (Sept. 1995).

 

            Records of the Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) indicate that the proposed assessment was delivered on December 11, 2013, and became a final order of the Commission on January 10, 2014. Mr. Hensley asserts he did not receive the proposed assessment because of a change in his home address. USPS records indicate that the proposed assessment was refused and later returned to MSHA because the addressee was unknown. The Secretary does not oppose the request to reopen. However, he notes that it was Hensley’s obligation to notify MSHA of his change of address. He urges Hensley to take steps to ensure that future penalty contests are timely filed.

 

            Having reviewed Hensley’s request and the Secretary’s response, in the interest of justice, we hereby reopen this matter and remand it to the Chief Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings pursuant to the Mine Act and the Commission’s Procedural Rules, 29 C.F.R. Part 2700. Accordingly, consistent with Rule 28, the Secretary shall file a petition for assessment of penalty within 45 days of the date of this order. See 29 C.F.R. § 2700.28.

 

 

 

/s/ Michael G. Young

Michael G. Young, Commissioner

 

 

 

/s/ Patrick K. Nakamura

Patrick K. Nakamura, Commissioner

 

 

 

/s/ William I. Althen

William I. Althen, Commissioner



[1] This case has been delegated to a panel of three Commissioners pursuant to section 113(c) of the Mine Act for the limited purpose of assessing the merits of the motion to reopen.  30 U.S.C. § 823(c).